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Despite initiatives focused toward acquisition reform through the reduction and 
simplification of acquisition policy and regulation, acquisition programs and projects 
continue to flounder, incurring cost and schedule overruns and experiencing acquisition 
program baseline (APB) breaches. A major contributor to these failures is the acquisition 
community’s inability to work collaboratively in understanding requirements and to 
translate those requirements into effective contracts. Program/project managers and their 
staffs are trained in acquisition policy and fiscal law, and their focus is on obtaining a 
contract that satisfies requirements and delivers a product or capability on time and 
within budget. The contracting community being trained in acquisition policy, fiscal law, 
and contracting law focuses its efforts on awarding legal and binding contracts that 
represent best value for the government, but not necessarily satisfying the customer’s 
requirements and not always in a timely manner. As an example, Michael Loya, one of 
the authors/researchers, shares his real-world personal experience where it took more 
than 21 months to work through the process of documenting the requirements, soliciting 
proposals, and awarding of a contract to support the sustainment of an information 
technology system. His anecdotal evidence shows that communication and collaboration 
between the contracting officer (KO) and the product director (PD) did not exist. This 
disparity and lack of collaborative focus resulted in two contract extensions at a cost of 
$5.2M before the award of the new contract, which cost $3M (W. Sarvay, personal 
communications, August 19, 2015).  
The focus of this project is to determine how the program management 
community and the contracting community can work in a more collaborative fashion, 
resulting in the award of a legal contract that satisfies customer requirements and delivers 
a product on time and within budget. We investigated how the program manager (PM) 
and the contracting officer (KO) work together within the framework of Defense 
Acquisition System, how they are trained, and how the constraints of the FAR, DOD 
5000 Series and other regulatory guidance impact their ability to operate. 
 xviii 
Our approach to the conduct of this research included a detailed literature review 
of the Federal Acquisition Regulation, (FAR Part 1 and Part 7), Defense Federal 
Acquisition Regulation Supplement, and DOD 5000.01, DODI 5000.02 Series. In 
addition, we reviewed the 2013 and 2014 Performance of the Defense Acquisition 
System reports where we gleaned relevant statistical data that identified markers of 
success/failure and the effects that consistent communication and collaboration has on 
them. Finally, we reviewed Better Buying Power (BBP) 3.0 (OUSD[AT&L], 2015, pp. 
1–33), where findings show that there was no consideration given in the tenants of BBP 
3.0 where communication and collaboration between the PM and KO would be 
encouraged. 
Next, we applied a mixed methods strategy to our research; collecting both 
quantative and qualitative data sources. We used quantitative data for the purpose of 
demonstrating current and past performance of the Defense Acquisition System with 
respect to cost, schedule, and performance. The qualitative data that we collected through 
interviews with acquisition professionals captured what was actually happening in PM 
offices and contracting shops and provided insight to the extent that the two organizations 
communicate. We chose a communication model, depicting basic communication 
principles and overlaid that with the Three Integrative Pillars of Success (TIPS) (Yoder, 
2010) model to describe communication in an environment encompassing several aspects 
for success. Our data analysis identified data points that, coupled with our literature 
review, were compared with the communications and TIPS model. From this comparison, 
we identified common themes related to early and consistent communications between 
the PM and KO and how these themes affected performance of the Defense Acquisition 
System (DAS).  
We concluded that there were five top common themes affecting performance of 
the DAS:  
1. ARP Collaboration – The ARP and all associated documentation must be 
developed collaboratively between the PM and KO to ensure accurate 
requirements are captured and procurable. Our research found that 
acquisitions utilizing non-embedded contracting professionals experienced 
a high rate of ARP rejection. 
 xix 
2. Contract Type – Interviews revealed several cases where an appropriate 
contract type was bilaterally selected between the PM and KO only to be 
rejected by the KO’s approving authority or higher headquarters. Instances 
were cited where often external pressures from headquarters and others 
would influence the selection of contract type; and the existence of an 
environment of conformance often time would pressure PMs and KOs to 
use whatever contract type is currently in favor, to the extent that it even 
may become linked to the career progression of these individuals.  
3. Effective Communication – Our research found that when contracting 
professionals are embedded in the program office, communication and 
collaboration activities were much more prevalent. If this is not possible, 
the contracting team must be customer-aligned, meaning that they are 
assigned to a single requiring activity. 
4. Policy – We uncovered that a common view is that laws and regulations 
are restrictive in nature; meaning that unless something is expressly 
allowed in writing then it is prohibited and the system becomes extremely 
slow and burdensome.  
5. Process – Our research found that the lack of an enterprise type system for 
the PM and KO to connect all functional areas, such as financial, logistics, 
requirements, contracting, security, etc., impedes the flow of information 
both up the chain of command for reporting purposes and across 
organizations for increased communication capabilities. 
In order to improve the performance of the DAS, we presented recommendations 
that address each theme in the same order and based on the models we used in this 
research:  
1. To improve ARP collaboration, internal protocols should be established 
that define how ARPs, SOWs, etc., will be developed collaboratively 
between the PM and KO. 
2. Empower the KO to use their warranted authority to select the appropriate 
contract that best supports the requirements. 
3. Establish effective communication and collaboration by physically co-
locating the contracting team with the PM or at a minimum customer-align 
the contracting to support the PM. 
4. Educate the acquisition community and leadership of the permissive 
nature of the laws and regulations. Without the freedom to make decisions 
consistent with the intent of the FAR, the system remains paralyzed. 
 xx 
5. Develop and deploy an Enterprise Resource Planning system that connects 
the acquisition community to achieve workflow optimization and provide 
information sharing. 
We end this research with a recommendation of further study in three distinct 
areas. First, to ensure our findings are truly representative of the larger acquisition 
community we feel it would be prudent to repeat this research with a much larger 
sampling of acquisition professionals. Second, an opportunity exists to investigate how 
frequently and why a KO’s determination of the type contract used for an acquisition can 
be unilaterally overturned based on outside or uninvolved influence. Finally, we feel that 
it would be beneficial to study the possibility of adding a communications tenant to the 
next iteration of Better Buying Power as improvement in this area will provide critical 
support to the overall goals of the initiative.  
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The objective of this research is to determine how early and consistent 
communication between the program manager (PM) and contracting officer (KO) affects, 
either positively or negatively, the success rates of Army acquisition programs. Programs 
continue to fail at a high rate. How do we quantify program failure? In the acquisition 
community, the definition of a measure of program success is the capability of delivering 
to the soldier, on time and within budget, satisfying user requirements, and is suitable, 
survivable, and maintainable. Measuring program failure can be considered ambiguous. 
According to J. Dillard, Senior Lecturer, Naval Postgraduate School (personal 
communication, August 15, 2015), failure has some tangible and intangible measures. 
For instance, in the case of the Javelin program from a cost and schedule perspective, 
“Javelin was a programmatic failure in development but a capability success once in 
production” (J. Dillard, personal communication, August 15, 2015).  
A perceived contributor to program failures is the acquisition community’s 
inability to work collaboratively to understand requirements and to translate those 
requirements into effective contracts, despite all the tools and guidance available to make 
them successful. During a June 2015 interview by Army AL&T magazine, Cedric T. 
Wins, director of the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) Requirements 
Integration Directorate, underscores the importance of communication and collaboration 
throughout the acquisition life cycle. “Wins also discussed … the importance of 
involving the acquisition workforce in the requirements process, ‘to ensure that we have 
some of [the acquisition community’s] best and brightest come and spend a little time on 
the operational side.’ Thus, each side can learn from the other, and both can better 
understand how a decision made early in the requirements process affects the acquisition 
community later” (“From concept to delivery,” 2015, p. 14). In Krieger’s Knowing and 
Loving Your KO, he shares the results of a study of program manager training and 
experience, conducted by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), where “program 
managers gave high marks to their acquisition training concerning ‘Contracting 
 2 
Challenges.’ But, personal one-on-one interviews with Program Executive Officers and 
Program Managers caveated that by indicating they were concerned about how to 
communicate, and get along with, their Contracting Officers (KOs).” (Krieger, 2011, p. 
40) 
This chapter provides a discussion of the approach followed in conducting this 
research, which determined how early and continuous communication between the PM 
and KO impacts the success rates of Army acquisition programs. Background 
information delineates the responsibilities of the PM and the KO, as well as the 
communication process that they must follow to ensure a successful acquisition. The 
methodology outlined in Section D of this chapter describes the multifaceted approach 
followed to examine the contract writing process from the perspective of key functional 
areas, the program manager and the contracting officer, as well as a combined view of the 
entire process. This methodology assisted us in achieving our research objective and 
answering our primary research question in Section E: To what degree does early and 
ongoing communication between the program manager and contracting officer impact the 
success or failure of Army acquisition programs? Section F of this chapter addresses how 
this research is organized and how we present our findings. Finally, we end this chapter 
by describing the benefits gleaned from this research: Increased communication and 
collaboration between the PM and KO will create an environment that encourages greater 
partnership between the two groups throughout the acquisition life cycle and enhances 
the chances of a successful acquisition. 
B. BACKGROUND 
1. Responsibilities 
Program manager (PM) – The PM is the “designated individual with the 
responsibility for and authority to accomplish program objectives for the development, 
production, and sustainment to meet the user’s operational needs” (Nash, O’Brien-
DeBakey, & Schooner, 2013, p. 402). The PM manages the system acquisition and as 
indicated by Engelbeck (2002) is responsible for developing acquisition strategies that 
promote full and open competition. If the PM chooses to develop the acquisition strategy 
 3 
without involving the KO, gaining the KO’s buy-in will be much longer and ultimately 
affect the timeline of the acquisition. Engelbeck describes the PM as the one tasked to 
“discipline the acquisition process and establish a climate and communication protocol 
that will ensure that the entire integrated acquisition team works together” (2002, p. 46). 
Following this logic, if it is successful, a collaborative relationship between the PM and 
KO will be formed and the development of the acquisition strategy will be a coordinated 
effort resulting in buy-in throughout the process. 
Contracting officer (KO) – The contracting community is trained in acquisition 
policy, fiscal law, and contracting law. The KO focuses efforts on awarding legal and 
binding contracts that represent best-value for the government while at the same time 
satisfying the customers’ requirements. In The government contracts reference book 
authors, Nash, O’Brien-DeBakey, and Schooner (2013), describe the contracting officer 
(KO) as “the government employee with the authority to legally bind the government by 
signing a contract” (as cited by Engelbeck, 2002, p. 47). In conformance with Federal 
Acquisition Regulation Subpart 1.6, Career Development, Contracting Authority, 
Responsibilities, contracting officers are appointed in writing using Standard Form (SF) 
1402 (Certificate of Appointment) by the head of the contracting agency or the designated 
representative. The agency head or the designated representative can stipulate on SF 1402 
any limitations to the KO’s authority, which will require the KO to conduct business 
within the parameters set forth in the appointment (Federal Acquisition Regulation, 2015, 
Subpart 1.6-2).  
2. PM/KO Communication 
The success of Army acquisitions depends on effective and efficient acquisition 
planning including collaboration and communication amongst the entire integrated 
acquisition team. Collaboration between the PM and the KO must begin from the earliest 
point in the planning process. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) states the 
importance of teaming and collaboration/involvement regarding acquisition planning. 
FAR Part 7.102 (b) states, “This planning shall integrate the efforts of all personnel 
responsible for significant aspects of the acquisition.” (2015) The Department of Defense 
 4 
directive 5000.01 states that, “acquisition, capability needs, and financial communities, 
and operational users shall maintain continuous and effective communications with each 
other by using Integrated Product Teams (IPTs).” (2003, p. 5) 
Communication is the process of sharing information that involves one person 
generating a message to another person or to a group of people with the intent that 
everyone will have a common understanding of the message. In Chapter 2 (Introduction 
to the Federal Acquisition Process) of Acquisition Management, Engelbeck introduces 
the “Communication Protocol for the Integrated Acquisition Team” (Anderson, 
Finkelstein, & Quinn, as cited by Engelbeck, 2002, p. 48). The Communication Protocol 
for the Integrated Acquisition Team diagram shown in Figure 1 depicts the two-way 
communication that takes place within the Integrated Acquisition Team to facilitate 
planning, reporting, and problem solving. 
Figure 1.  Communication Protocol for the Integrated Acquisition Team 
 
From Engelbeck, R. M. (2002). Acquisition management. Vienna, VA: Management 
Concepts. 
The Communication Protocol (Figure 1) supports the premise that early and 
continuous communication between the PM and the KO will result in program success. 
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C. OBJECTIVE OF STUDY 
The scope of this analysis considers the issues and constraints surrounding the 
writing and awarding of contracts following the framework of the Defense Acquisition 
System (DAS). It also focuses on how program and contract performance are impacted 
by early and consistent communication between the PM and KO. 
Our research achieves the following objectives: 
 Addressing how the program manager (PM) and the contracting officer 
(KO) work together within the framework of the DOD 5000.01 and the 
FAR 
 Determining how well the PM and KO are trained and the level of 
knowledge each possesses of their own field and that of their counterpart 
 Determining the constraints the PM and KO must work in and how those 
constraints impact communications and collaboration  
In achieving these objectives, we determine the extent to which early and 
consistent communication between the PM and KO helps or hurts the success rates of 
Army acquisition programs.  
D. METHODOLOGY 
This research is an investigative analysis of the Army’s process of writing and 
awarding contracts under the Defense Acquisition System (DAS). We use a multifaceted 
approach to thoroughly examine the process from the perspective of each key functional 
area, the program manager and the contracting officer, as well as a combined view of the 
process as a whole. Methods and models used in this analysis include quantitative and 
qualitative data sources, Schramm’s Overlapping Field of Experience Communication 
model (Schramm, The Process and Effects of Mass Communication, as cited in Certo, & 
Certo, 2006, p. 332); and Yoder’s Three Integrative Pillars of Success model (TIPS) 
(Yoder, 2010, p. 42). We detail these methods and models in Chapter III, and we present 
findings of our data analysis in Chapter IV, which are the result of using these methods 
and models in the conduct of our research. 
Through statistical data we show that in spite of continuing acquisition reform and 
increasing regulation, there are no shortages of program failures and overruns within the 
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Department of Defense. This paper identifies critical areas of the acquisition process 
where due to lack of effort, over-burdensome constraints, or some other cause, a 
breakdown occurs between program manager’s and contracting officer’s functions, 
contributing in-whole or in-part to program acquisition program baseline (APB) breaches 
or program failures. To determine program failure/breach ties to problems with contracts, 
data from the office of Performance Assessments and Root Cause Analysis (PARCA) and 
statistics from Nunn-McCurdy were analyzed. We collected available information on 
relevant contract specifics such as type, unmeasurable requirements, etc.  
First, a thorough review of existing regulatory and guidance documentation 
provided a picture of how the functions of program manager and contracting officer 
operate and interact within the Defense Acquisition Management System (DAMS). To 
quantify the collaboration and communication that is required for success, key documents 
such as the DOD 5000 Series, Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), Defense Federal 
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), as well as several supplementary 
documents, such as Better Buying Power (BBP), were cross-walked to identify boundary 
conditions and intersection points. This portion of the analysis answered the question, “At 
which points in the DAMS is interaction required between the PM and KO,” and “Which 
function is driving the requirement?” This review also highlighted boundary conditions 
that may limit the flexibility of either functional area, leading to problems writing or 
awarding a contract.  
Second, we conducted in-person interviews with subject matter experts in the 
functional areas of Program Management and Contracting. Individuals were asked a 
series of questions relating to their experiences as program manager, contracting officer, 
or specific supporting staff. Data collected from all interviews was consolidated and 
synthesized, resulting in the identification of trends, common indicators, and unusual 
characteristics.  
Finally, with the data collected and synthesized, a we made a comparison against 
the framework outlined by the literature review and a conclusion about whether or not 
early communication between the functional areas of interest is helpful and whether it is 
aided or hindered by policy. In order to provide the data needed to support the primary 
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research question, we obtained answers to the secondary research questions. To gain 
insight into this complex issue, we considered failure rates, communication issues, and 
policy.  
E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
To determine whether communication, or lack thereof, is a root cause of poor 
contract and program performance, we developed the following research questions:  
 Primary research question: To what degree does early and ongoing 
communication between the program manager and contracting officer 
impact the success or failure of Army acquisition programs?  
 Secondary research question 1: Are problems with requests for 
proposals (RFPs) and contracts related to poor communication and 
collaboration between the KO and PM? 
 Secondary research question 2: Do current acquisition policy, law, 
training, and regulation impact the success/failure rates of contract 
execution?  
These questions guided our research, and the answers provided the data necessary 
to conduct analysis and to determine a conclusion, which we provide in Chapters IV and V. 
F. ORGANIZATION 
In Chapter II, we set the conditions for addressing our research topic by 
conducting a literature review. We review regulatory directives such as the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR), Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
(DFARS), the Department of Defense (DOD) 5000 Series, the Defense Acquisition 
Guidebook, and Better Buying Power initiatives. Finally, we examine various 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports and Performance Assessments and 
Root Cause Analysis (PARCA) reports, which address failures in the Army Acquisition 
Process. 
In Chapter III, we identify the methods and models used in conducting data 
analysis. We selected a mixed methods’ approach that included quantitative and 
qualitative data sources. For the purposes of examining the current and past performance 
of the Defense Acquisition System, quantitative data was gathered and used to provide 
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the best insight into the current state of the process with respect to cost, schedule, and 
performance. To examine the way the Defense Acquisition System works from the 
perspective of those who operate within it, we gathered qualitative data through 
interviews with acquisition professionals working in Program Management and Contract 
Management. We used an interview-data extrapolation model to conduct data analysis 
with a simple pivot table, displaying the results of that analysis graphically. Finally, we 
coupled Schramm’s communication model (Schramm, The Process and Effects of Mass 
Communication, as cited in Certo, & Certo, 2006, p. 332) with the Three Integrative 
Pillars of Success (TIPS). This is at the center of successful communications between the 
PM and KO to ensure a robust and collaborative environment within the Integrated 
Acquisition Team tasked with translating requirements into effective contracts.  
In Chapter IV, we present the data analysis findings that resulted from using these 
methods and models. The statistical evidence shows current performance metrics of the 
Defense Acquisition System. Case studies from the office of PARCA show that contracts 
are a contributing factor in performance problems with programs. The evidence depicts a 
system that is making improvements in some areas; it also highlights areas where 
opportunities exist to make improvements that will benefit program and contract 
performance. Finally, analysis findings of interview data produced common themes 
dealing with PM/KO communication; these are evaluated against the TIPS and 
Schramm’s (Schramm, The Process and Effects of Mass Communication, as cited in 
Certo, & Certo, 2006, p. 332) communications models and compared with the current 
literature covered in Chapter II to better understand what is working well and what is not. 
In Chapter V, we finalize this report, which answers our primary and secondary 
research questions, provides our recommendations, and presents other topics that could 
benefit from further research. 
G. BENEFIT 
Program managers and contracting officers must possess strong interpersonal 
skills to foster a collaborative environment early on and throughout the acquisition 
process. This type of environment contributes to ensuring the award of a legal and 
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binding contract that is clear and complete, satisfies customer requirements, and provides 
a positive impact on program and contract performance. The benefit that comes from 
conducting this research is the identification of those critical moments and events in the 
acquisition life cycle where increased communication and collaboration between the PM 
and KO will enhance the chances for success of program and contract performance. The 
data gathered and analyzed throughout this study provides insight to the environment in 
which the PM and KO operate and identifies common themes related to early and 
consistent communications that could affect the rate at which a program or contract either 
succeeds or fails. Based on our research, analysis, and findings, we present 
recommendations that encourage greater partnership and collaboration between the two 
groups and we identify areas of this research that show potential benefit from further 
research. 
H. SUMMARY 
In this chapter we discussed the objective of our research and provided arguments 
for why communication and collaboration between the PM and KO is so critical to the 
success of a program. Background information was presented which delineated the 
responsibilities of the PM and the KO. We identified the reasons for conducting this 
research and we presented the primary and secondary questions that guided this research. 
The organization section of this chapter described how our research is structured and how 
we will present our findings. Finally, we identified the benefits of this research, where 
increased communication and collaboration between the PM and KO will create an 
environment that encourages a greater partnership between the two groups throughout the 
acquisition life cycle and enhance the chances of a successful acquisition. In Chapter II, 
we provide a literature review of regulatory directives that guide how the Army 
Acquisition process operates as well as government reports that address challenges and 
failures in the process. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Chapter I provided a background and basis for this research by explaining the 
issues and concerns considered contributors that influence the success or failure of Army 
acquisitions. This chapter focuses on the Federal Acquisition Regulations and regulatory 
directives such as the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), Defense Federal 
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), Department of Defense (DOD) 5000 
Series, and Better Buying Power initiatives—all designed to govern and enable the Army 
Acquisition process. We examine various Performance Assessments and Root Cause 
Analysis (PARCA) reports, and we use all this information to aid in the analysis of this 
research. 
A. FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION SYSTEM 
The Federal Acquisition Act of 1977 authorized the implementation of the 
Federal Acquisition Regulations, forming the basis to codify and publish policy and 
procedure for acquisitions by all Executive Agencies. The system is comprised of the 
FAR and agency acquisition regulations such as the DFARS and Department of Defense 
5000 Series, which support implementing or supplementing the FAR. Management of the 
FAR is the joint responsibility of the “Secretary of Defense, the Administrator, General 
Services Administration [GSA], and the Administrator, [National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration] NASA.” The FAR is revised by a coordinated effort of two councils, 
“the Defense Acquisition Regulations Council [DAR Council] and the Civilian Agency 
Acquisition Council [CAA Council]” (Hearn, 2006 p. 7). The FAR and all revisions are 
available on the Internet at https://www.acquisition.gov/?q=browsefar.  
The FAR is the primary regulation that controls the Federal Acquisition System. 
It applies to all federal agencies executing acquisitions made with “appropriated funds for 
all supplies and services, which include research and development; and construction, 
alteration, repair and maintenance of real property” (Hearn, 2006, p. 7). The FAR is 
comprised of two chapters: Chapter I covers FASR Part 1 through Part 51, and Chapter II 
covers FAR Part 52 and Part 53. For the purposes of this literature review, we will focus 
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on FAR Part 1 and FAR Part 7 as these two parts of the FAR relate to our research. FAR 
Part 1 addresses the purpose, authority and guiding principles of the Federal Acquisition 
System. FAR Part 7 addresses Acquisition Planning, which is key to contract award and 
the successful performance of a program. 
The purpose and authority of the FAR can be found in FAR Subpart 1.101. FAR 
Subpart 1.102 discusses the Guiding Principles for the Federal Acquisition System: 
 The vision for the Federal Acquisition System is to deliver on a timely 
basis the best value product or service to the customer, while maintaining 
the public’s trust and fulfilling public policy objectives. Participants in the 
acquisition process should work together as a team and should be 
empowered to make decisions within their area of responsibility.  
 The Federal Acquisition System will:  
(1) Satisfy the customer in terms of cost, quality, and timeliness of the delivered 
product or service by, for example:  
(2) Maximizing the use of commercial products and services, 
(3) Using contractors who have a track record of successful past performance or 
who demonstrate a current superior ability to perform; and 
(4) Promoting competition, 
(5) Minimizing administrative operating costs, 
(6) Conducting business with integrity, fairness, and openness, and 
(7) Fulfilling public policy objectives. 
 The Acquisition Team consists of all participants in Government 
acquisition including not only representatives of the technical, supply, and 
procurement communities but also the customers they serve, and the 
contractors who provide the products and services. 
 The role of each member of the Acquisition Team is to exercise personal 
initiative and sound business judgment in providing the best-value product 
or service to meet the customer’s needs. In exercising initiative, 
Government members of the Acquisition Team may assume if a specific 
strategy, practice, policy or procedure is in the best interests of the 
Government and is not addressed in the FAR, nor prohibited by law 
(statute or case law), Executive order or other regulation, that the strategy, 
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practice, policy or procedure is a permissible exercise of authority. 
(Federal Acquisition Regulation, 2015, Subpart 1.102)  
The guiding principles or standards of the FAR, customer satisfaction, minimizing 
operating cost, “maintaining the public trust, and fulfilling public policy objectives” 
(Engelbeck, 2002, p. 16), provide the criteria for which the acquisition team can measure 
how well they perform and can gauge how successful they are at meeting the vision for 
the Federal Acquisition System. These standards, shown in Figure 2, provide a 
framework for the acquisition team to leverage during the decision-making process. 
Figure 2.  Standards of Performance for the Acquisition System 
 
From Engelbeck, R. M. (2002). Acquisition management. Vienna, VA: Management 
Concepts. 
From the standpoint of this analysis, the first standard, customer satisfaction, is 
most relevant and it implies that “the product is more important than the process” 
(Engelbeck, 2002, p. 17). It is mandatory to follow the seven elements, depicted in Figure 
3, of this standard to ensure success.  
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Figure 3.  Key Elements of Customer Satisfaction 
 
 
From Engelbeck, R. M. (2002). Acquisition management. Vienna, VA: Management 
Concepts. 
(1) The ultimate user’s needs are paramount; 
(2) Continuous communication is key to define and refine performance 
characteristics of the product or service sought; 
(3) Consideration of a potential offeror’s ability to provide the product or 
service sought; 
(4) Identification of sources within industry that have the potential to provide 
the designated products or service; 
(5) Promotion of effective competition; 
(6) Propensity to deliver to a high-quality product when and where it is 
needed at a cost effective price; and 
(7) Leverage advanced planning as part of the overall process while ensuring 
the objective capability remains flexible (Engelbeck, 2002, pp. 17–18). 
All members of the acquisition process are responsible for making decisions that 
will ensure the delivery of “the best value product or service to the customer” (Federal 
Acquisition Regulation, Part 1, Subpart 1.102).  
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FAR Part 1 establishes the general policy and information regarding the Federal 
Acquisition Regulations; FAR Part 7 addresses Acquisition Planning. Specifically, FAR 
Part 7.1 discusses “the policies and procedures for developing acquisition plans, 
determining whether to use commercial or Government resources for the acquisition of 
supplies and services” (Hearn, 2006, p. 27), deciding if it is cost effective to lease or 
invest in the purchase of equipment, and determining functions that are inherently 
governmental. Acquisition planning uses the coordination of the integrated acquisition 
team’s efforts in determining procurement needs. It identifies the technical, business, and 
management considerations that will influence the team’s decision-making process when 
developing the Acquisition Plan. 
General procedures of FAR Part 7 are found in Sub-Part 7.104, which states that 
acquisition planning will be initiated upon the identification of a need and should be 
conducted in advance of the fiscal year (FY) that the capability or service is required 
(Federal Acquisition Regulation, 2015, Subpart 7.104). This lead time in the acquisition 
process is necessary to ensure that administrative requirements are satisfied and actual 
production of the item or service needed is completed and placed in the hands of the 
customer or end users within the time specified.  
Acquisition planning demands a dedicated teaming effort and requires all team 
members to coordinate and integrate their skill sets to ensure the development of a 
complete and comprehensive Acquisition Plan. 
B. DEFENSE FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION SUPPLEMENT  
The Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) is a 
supplement to the FAR and it facilitates the implementation of the FAR in Department of 
Defense (DOD) organizations.  
DOD implementation and supplementation of the FAR is issued in the 
DFARS under authorization and subject to the authority, direction, and 
control of the Secretary of Defense. The DFARS contains: 
 Requirements of law;  
 DOD-wide policies;  
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 Delegations of FAR authorities;  
 Deviations from FAR requirements; and  
 Policies/procedures that have a significant effect beyond the internal 
operating procedures of DOD or a significant cost or administrative 
impact on contractors or offerors. (Defense Federal Acquisition 
Regulation Supplement (DFARS), 2015, § 201.301)  
The DFARS follows the same format as the FAR and is different only in the 
numbering schema. For instance, DFARS Part 207 Acquisition Planning addresses FAR 
Part 7 Acquisition Planning. The DFARS does not supersede or replace the FAR; it 
augments the FAR and further prescribes policy to enable the Federal Acquisition 
Regulations within the DOD. By law, the DFARS cannot negate any of the policies and 
directives set forth in the FAR. 
C. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) 5000 SERIES 
The DOD 5000 Series documents are a collection of Directives, Instructions, and 
Memoranda that collectively build a framework that governs the operation of the Defense 
Acquisition System. The original 5000 Series documents were penned in the early 1970s 
during the first Nixon administration. The catalyst for creating this framework goes back 
to the late 1960s, when public and congressional disenchantment with the waning war in 
Vietnam along with the rising cost of weapon systems’ acquisitions led to attempts by 
Congress to reduce defense spending (Ferrara, 1996, p. 110). Then Secretary of Defense, 
Melvin Laird, and his Deputy, David Packard, decided that a formal acquisition 
framework was the best approach for managing defense acquisition in the new fiscally 
constrained environment. The Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) 
was formed in May 1969 by then Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard to advise 
the Secretary of Defense on major weapon systems acquisitions (Packard, 1969, p. 3). 
Packard issued a second memorandum on defense acquisition in May 1970 that, 
“articulated many of the broad themes that would later become the foundation for the first 
DOD 5000 Series” (Ferrara, 1996, p. 111); these themes included, “decentralized 
execution, streamlined management structures, and use of appropriate contract 
mechanisms” (Ferrara, 1996, p. 111). According to Packard, “the primary objective of 
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DOD oversight is to enable the Services to improve the management of their programs” 
(Packard, 1970, p. 1). The first formally issued DOD 5000 Series was in July of 1971, 
and the “Mode of Operation” outlined in this austere seven-page document is this: 
Successful development, production, and deployment of major defense 
systems are primarily dependent upon competent people, rational 
priorities, and clearly defined responsibilities. Responsibility and authority 
for the acquisition of major defense systems shall be decentralized to the 
maximum practicable extent consistent with the urgency and importance 
of each program. The development and production of a major defense 
system shall be managed by a single individual (program manager) who 
shall have a charter which provides sufficient authority to accomplish 
recognized program objectives. Layers of authority between the program 
manager and his Component Head shall be minimum… [The] assignment 
and tenure of program managers shall be a matter of concern to DOD 
Component Heads and shall reflect career incentives designed to attract, 
retain, and reward competent personnel. (Department of Defense, 1971, p. 
1) 
While the DOD 5000 Series has undergone 16 rewrite (Table 1) since the original 
document and ballooned at times to 900 pages in length, including references, many of 
the modifications reflect an attempt to realize principals and themes that can be traced 
back to the original document and vision. Since this research analyzes the contracting 
function, it is important to highlight two relevant program considerations outlined in the 
first issuance of the 5000 Series. First, consideration (7) “contract type shall be consistent 
with all program characteristics, including risk” (Ferrara, 1996, p. 112), and the second 
consideration is (8) “source selection decisions shall take into account the contractor’s 
capability to develop a necessary defense system on a timely and cost-effective basis” 
(Ferrara, 1996, p. 112). The fact that two out of nine considerations address contracting 
issues speaks volumes to understanding the importance of this critical piece even during 
the early days of managing defense acquisition. 
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Table 1.   Number of DOD 5000 Issuances per Administration 
















2 (2013 Interim, 15) 
After Ferrara, J. (1996). DOD’s 5000 documents: Evolution and change in defense 
acquisition policy. Acquisition Review Quarterly, 3(2), 109–130. Retrieved from 
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA317765 
As of the writing of this paper, the current release of the directive portion of the 
series, DODD 5000.01, was on May 12, 2003, and it was certified current as of 
November 20, 2007. While this document is only 10 pages, it contains the core policy for 
governing the DAS. The fact that the directive document has withstood 12 years, two 
administrations, and three rewrites of the corresponding instructional document speaks 
volumes to the fact that the principals and themes contained within the directive are still 
relevant. There is, however, as evidenced by the three corresponding rewrites, agreement 
that we are not achieving the policies set forth by the directive, and there is more work to 
be done to achieve them. 
The current DODD 5000.01 Section 2.2 states that this policy is applicable to “all 
acquisition programs” (Department of Defense, 2003, p. 1). In an effort to better 
understand the regulatory framework that PMs and KOs are required to operate within, 
this paper will outline the relevant sections of the 5000 Series with respect to contracting 
and collaboration. The directive establishes policy for several items, four of which—
collaboration, competition, cost sharing, and performance-based acquisition—will be 
investigated further.  
First, collaboration (a portion of this research’s title) is mandated by DOD policy 
for all acquisitions: 
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The DOD acquisition, capability needs, and financial communities, and 
operational users shall maintain continuous and effective communications 
with each other by using Integrated Product Teams (IPTs). Teaming 
among warfighters, users, developers, acquirers, technologists, testers, 
budgeters, and sustainers shall begin during capability needs definition. 
MDAs [milestone decision authority] and PMs are responsible for making 
decisions and leading execution of their programs, and are accountable for 
results. (Department of Defense, 2003, p. 5) 
As stated in the policy excerpt, “continuous and effective” communications are 
not only expected but also mandated in this directive between all parties to include the 
PM and KO functions. Further reading reveals that this communication shall be enabled 
by using IPTs, and this process will begin during the capability needs’ phase of the 
acquisition. The question of whether or not this mandated communication is occurring 
and, if so, its level of effectiveness, will be further investigated in Chapters III and IV. 
Second, competition is required in accordance with the current statutory 
requirements addressing the issue. The policy states that: 
Competition shall provide major incentives to industry and Government 
organizations to innovate, reduce cost, and increase quality. All of the 
DOD Components shall acquire systems, subsystems, equipment, 
supplies, and services in accordance with the statutory requirements for 
competition. Acquisition managers shall take all necessary actions to 
promote a competitive environment, including the consideration of 
alternative systems to meet stated mission needs; structuring Science and 
Technology (S&T) investments and acquisition strategies to ensure the 
availability of competitive suppliers throughout a program’s life, and for 
future programs; ensuring that prime contractors foster effective 
competition for major and critical products and technologies; and ensuring 
that qualified international sources are permitted to compete. If 
competition is not available, PMs shall consider alternatives that will yield 
the benefits of competition. (Department of Defense, 2003, p. 5) 
It is clear from the policy that competition is a cornerstone of establishing value 
for the DOD. For multiple reasons including cost, innovation, and quality, it is imperative 
that competition is leveraged whenever and wherever possible. This piece is key in 
establishing the acquisition and business strategies, which are discussed later in this 
chapter.  
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Third, cost sharing is an important part of the 5000 Series that requires a sharing 
of cost risk between the contractor and government. The policy states that: 
The PM shall structure the acquisition in a way that neither imposes undue 
risk on contractors, nor requires unusual contractor investment. 
Contractors shall not be encouraged nor required to invest their profit 
dollars or independent research and development funds to subsidize 
defense research and development contracts, except in unusual situations 
where there is a reasonable expectation of a potential commercial 
application. Contractors are entitled to earn reasonable rewards on DOD 
contracts, including competitively awarded contracts. (Department of 
Defense, 2003, p. 6) 
This policy is important to ensure that contractors do not take undue risk while at 
the same time to protect the government by ensuring that, by lack of prohibition, the 
contractor can be burdened with some normal level of investment and risk responsibility 
commensurate with the contract being awarded. This policy is important to consider 
when looking at how the PM and KO will communicate and develop an acquisition 
strategy to meet these policies while simultaneously getting the procurement 
accomplished. 
Finally, performance-based acquisition is a policy portion of the directive stating 
that requirements must be performance-based leading to maximizing competition and 
flexibility. The directive states: 
To maximize competition, innovation, and interoperability, and to enable 
greater flexibility in capitalizing on commercial technologies to reduce 
costs, acquisition managers shall consider and use performance-based 
strategies for acquiring and sustaining products and services whenever 
feasible. …When using performance-based strategies, contract 
requirements shall be stated in performance terms, limiting the use of 
military specifications and standards to Government-unique requirements 
only. Acquisition managers shall base configuration management 
decisions on factors that best support implementing performance-based 
strategies throughout the product life cycle. (Department of Defense, 
2003, p. 7) 
Requiring performance-based acquisition makes early collaboration even more 
critical. Capturing needs during requirements definition expressed in terms of capabilities 
is mandatory. The collective efforts of the PM and KO teams here are invaluable in 
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determining a set of performance characteristics that are not only representative of the 
capability being sought, but are also procurable in a contract, meaning that the 
performance specifications are testable and verifiable.  
The corresponding instructional or implementation document within the 5000 
Series is the DODI 5000.02. As of the writing of this document, the current version dates 
from January 7, 2015. The following is an overview of how the previously reviewed 
contracting-related policies are outlined within the instruction.  
Per the previously reviewed policies, the contracting team will be in collaboration 
with the program management team starting with capability needs’ definition. This early 
collaboration, facilitated by using IPT, is invaluable during source selection by ensuring 
that all requirements are clearly defined, procurable, and are performance-based, ensuring 
maximum competition and flexibility. From this early collaboration, the first product to 
be developed will be the acquisition strategy. The acquisition strategy will outline the 
“plan for program execution across the entire program life cycle” (Department of 
Defense, 2015, p. 75). It is an all-inclusive, living document that will cover items such as 
acquisition approach, assumptions, business environment, risk, contracts, incentives, and 
much more. Two of the key portions of the document with respect to contracting 
involvement are the contract type determination and the termination liability estimate. 
First, the contract type must be consistent with the program’s current level of risk, and 
the selection of fixed or cost type must be justified. As part of the overall acquisition 
strategy, the MDA will approve the selection and justification. Second, the termination 
liability estimate is required to be included in the acquisition strategy for MDAPs where 
the potential liability termination could be reasonably expected to exceed $100 million. 
This highlights the need to balance effectively the selection of contract type such that 
government liability is limited, contractor is not burdened unduly by risk or investment, 
and competition is utilized to the maximum extent practicable. As part of the acquisition 
strategy, the contracting and program management teams will draft a business strategy 
which will specifically address the rationale for the contracting approach that is outlined 
in the acquisition strategy. The business strategy will address how competition is enabled 
and maintained and how incentives will be used to meet program goals.  
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Throughout the acquisition cycle several key contracting or contracting-involved 
events occur prior to and after every milestone. First is the creation or update, depending 
on the milestone, of the acquisition strategy that includes the business plan. Second is the 
development of the source selection plan for the upcoming issuance of contracts just after 
the impending milestone. Third is the draft and the final RFP for the contracts desired in 
the next phase. After the MDA approves entrance to the next phase, the source selection 
is completed and contracts issued. This process starts again for the next milestone and 
contracts for the following phase of the program. For these reasons, it is critical to have 
ongoing and meaningful communications between the PM and KO. 
D. DEFENSE ACQUISITION GUIDEBOOK 
By design, The Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAG) provides guidance and 
best practices to the acquisition community, and it is based on the Department of Defense 
directive (DODD) 5000.01, The Defense Acquisition System, and Department of Defense 
instruction (DODI) 5000.02, Operation of the Acquisition Management System. The 
version evaluated here does not yet reflect the changes in the DODI 5000.02 (Defense 
Acquisition University, 2012, Forward). The DAG is an online resource accessible 
through the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) website. To highlight the importance 
of communication and collaboration between the PM and KO, the focus is on those best 
practices as specified in the DAG. 
DAG Chapter 2 discusses the development of an acquisition strategy stating that, 
“A program’s strategy should be developed organically by the Program Management 
Office in collaboration with related communities and stakeholders” (Defense Acquisition 
University, 2012, sect 2.0.1). The development of the Technology Development Strategy 
(TDS) embodies the importance of this statement, and TDS precedes the acquisition 
strategy (AS) and the release of an RFP. The TDS and AS include the Business Strategy, 
the Contracting Strategy, and Incentives for the proposed program—all of which would 
benefit from discussion with a KO since this forms the basis of solicitation to which 
contractors will reply with their proposals. 
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Addressed in DAG Chapter 14 is the acquisition of services. It gives great 
emphasis on the importance of establishing the acquisition team early on in the process. 
“Getting your acquisition team organized and focused early in the process is a 
fundamental key to successfully achieving the mission results your customers require” 
(Defense Acquisition University, 2012, sect 14.1, para 2). 
In the framework for the Service Acquisition Process (Figure 4), the DAG 
addresses the Planning, Development, and Execution Phases of the program. Figure 4 
lists the recommended team members as well as the process. It is important that the team 
collaboration starts very early in the process where the RFP and contract award do not 
happen until steps 4–6. This indicates that a lot of work and preparation happens up front, 
and it should include coordination and communication with the team, including the 
contracting representatives. 
Figure 4.  Framework for the Service Acquisition Process 
 
From Defense Acquisition University. (2012). Defense acquisition guidebook. Ft. 
Belvoir, VA: Author. Retrieved from https://dag.dau.mil/Pages/Default.aspx 
E. PERFORMANCE OF THE DEFENSE ACQUISITION SYSTEM 
Our research questions revolve around communication between the KO and PM 
early in the contracting process as well as how the current laws, statutes, and regulations 
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impact the ability to create contracts which contain well-defined and measurable 
requirements; they also revolve around the type of contract used. The acquisition process 
is under continuous examination that leads to evolving direction on how to execute 
contracts. Better Buying Power (BBP) is leading many of those changes, and it is worth 
further examination here.  
As part of an ongoing effort to understand the current state of the Defense 
Acquisition System, the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics USD(AT&L) commissioned an annual study and resulting report. These reports 
provide a better understanding of the working acquisition process. “Working acquisition 
process” means the reality of how the acquisition workforce functions throughout the 
year, the real challenges, and the hurdles imposed by the statutes and laws governing the 
acquisition process. The 2013 report focused on the effects of the statutes and laws, while 
this year the focus is on incentives used in contract type and the major drivers in 
schedule, cost, and technical performance (OUSD[AT&L], 2014, p. iii). 
From the following comment by Mr. Frank Kendall, Under Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, it is evident that there is a need for the 
flexibility to tailor individual acquisition programs to the specific circumstances:  
These findings do not, however, dictate “one size fits all” policies. 
Defense acquisition is complicated and varying. There are no simple 
“schoolhouse” solutions that should be mandated absent the particulars of 
each acquisition in question. These findings do, however, inform our 
individual program decisions and provide fresh insights into what 
generally works in what circumstances and why. This is critical to 
improving our performance: We must empower, encourage, and train our 
workforce to think—not dictate a cookbook that workforce members 
blindly follow. (OUSD[AT&L]), 2014, p. iv) 
F. BETTER BUYING POWER 
Achieving Dominant Capabilities through Technical Excellence and Innovation 
Launched in 2010, Better Buying Power (BBP) is a continuous and evolving 
effort. The end result is the ability to deliver quality products to the defense workforce 
and military, starting with quality planning and execution of the program. BBP identifies 
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initiatives intended to enhance the acquisition community and increase the success of 
government programs. It is relevant to this research in that it is the most recent effort to 
address the complexity of the acquisition process and some of the identified shortcomings 
within the community. There are, however, no specific actions that create an environment 
where the communication and collaboration between the PM and KO would be 
encouraged. BBP 3.0, released April 2015, is focused on providing technically superior 
items, dominant capabilities, and quality products to the warfighters while controlling 
excessive costs and schedules (OUSD[AT&L], 2015, pp. 1–33). Achievement of these 
objectives is possible through the development of new and adding to existing Defense 
Acquisition University (DAU) training, as well as the review and issuance of guidance to 
services and agencies that address best practices, communication, and collaboration.  
The hypothesis for our thesis is that increased communication early in the 
acquisition program between the KO and PM will lead to projects that are more 
successful. In evaluating BBP 3.0, it is clear that adhering to requirements, using correct 
contract types, increasing communication, and building partnerships among acquisition 
communities are important. 
G. PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENTS AND ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS 
The Office of Performance Assessments and Root Cause Analysis (PARCA) is a 
Directorate of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition. PARCA 
“is the central office for major defense authorization performance assessment, root cause 
analysis, and earned value management within the Department of Defense” (“About 
PARCA,” n.d., About section). The PARCA office “was established by section 103 of the 
Weapons System Acquisition Reform Act [WSARA] of 2009” (“About PARCA,” n.d., 
About section). The director of the Office of PARCA is responsible for submitting an 
annual report (no later than March 1) to Congress outlining findings of performance 
assessments and root cause analyses conducted during the prior year (“About PARCA,” 
n.d., About section, Initiatives para.). WSARA Section 103 (c) and (d) outline the 
evaluation and assessment criteria for conducting performance assessments and root 
cause analyses: 
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PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENTS: For purposes of this section, a 
performance assessment with respect to a major defense acquisition 
program is an evaluation of the following: 
The cost, schedule, and performance of the program, relative to current 
metrics, including performance requirements and baseline descriptions;  
The extent to which the level of program cost, schedule, and performance 
predicted relative to such metrics is likely to result in the timely delivery 
of a level of capability to the warfighter that is consistent with the level of 
resources to be expended and provides superior value to alternative 
approaches that may be available to meet the same military requirement;  
ROOT CAUSE ANALYSES: For purposes of this section and section 
2433a of title 10, United States Code (as so added), a root cause analysis 
with respect to a major defense acquisition program is an assessment of 
the underlying cause or causes of shortcomings in cost, schedule, or 
performance of the program, including the role, if any, of: 
 Unrealistic performance expectations;  
 Unrealistic baseline estimates for cost or schedule;  
 Immature technologies or excessive manufacturing or integration risk;  
 Unanticipated design, engineering, manufacturing, or technology 
integration issues arising during program performance;  
 Changes in procurement quantities;  
 Inadequate program funding or funding instability;  
 Poor performance by government or contractor personnel responsible for 
program Management; or 
 Any other matters. (Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act, 2009, p. 
14) 
In Chapter IV, we examine various reports developed by PARCA that resulted 
from the office conducting root cause analyses of contract cost growth associated with 
enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems, program acquisition unit cost increases of 
the Global Hawk program, and the root cause of the Nunn-McCurdy breach experienced 
by the Joint Tactical Radio System in 2011. We use the data gathered from these reports 
to assist in developing our findings and results for this research. 
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H. SUMMARY 
The focus of this literature review is on those aspects of existing regulations and 
processes that are designed to ensure successful execution of an acquisition with regards 
to encouraging and enabling the PMs’ and KOs’ communication and collaboration early 
in the acquisition life cycle. In this chapter, we reviewed the regulatory directives that 
guide how the Army Acquisition process operates, as well as written reports and 
assessments to address the hardships and failures of that process. We also analyzed 
reports that underscore the importance of PM and KO communication and collaboration 
early in the program’s life cycle to ensure accurate and well-defined requirements are in 
the contract and to ensure the use of the correct contract type. In Chapter III, we describe 
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III. DATA ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK 
This chapter describes the framework and models used for the data analysis 
presented in Chapter IV. The boundary conditions and thought processes that played a 
role in shaping the course of this research is also examined.  
We selected mixed methods research as the best fit for the type of analysis that is 
required to support the thesis of this paper adequately. By utilizing both quantitative and 
qualitative data sources, a clearer picture emerged with regard to the phenomenon of why 
poor program and contract performance exists and how early and consistent 
communication between the PM and KO impacts that performance. For the purposes of 
examining the current and past performance of the Defense Acquisition System, we 
determined that quantitative data provided the most useful insight into the current state of 
the process with respect to cost, schedule, and performance. It was also determined that 
although quantitative data would be good for evaluating the current performance of the 
Defense Acquisition System, that alone would not provide the requisite data required to 
conduct an analysis that would result in findings that we could report with confidence. 
For this type of analysis, and to examine the way the Defense Acquisition System works 
from the perspective of those who operate within it, a qualitative data set was required. 
The mixed methods approach used in this paper fuses statistical performance data with 
interview data from professionals in the field of defense acquisition. To demonstrate the 
problem, the statistical data used in support of this paper were incorporated. In order to 
academically propose a contributing factor, root cause, or possible solution, the 
supporting evidence proving the existence of a problem or defect must first be present. 
The qualitative interview data along with reduction and analysis provided the bulk of this 
research. 
The research for this paper conforms to all Naval Postgraduate School guidelines 
regarding the conduct of Human Subjects Research. After the decision was made to 
conduct interviews as a means for gathering the qualitative data needed for analysis, 
interview questions were formulated using an analysis matrix to cross-walk the research 
questions and analysis required to formulate the actual questions. These questions along 
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with the formal research protocol for this project were submitted to the NPS Institutional 
Review Board for ruling. The finding by the current IRB chair was that this research, 
“did not involve collecting information about a living individual” (C. Lai [Human 
Research Protection Program Administrator], personal communication, February 25, 
2015). This is because the interview questions were specifically designed to capture 
factual experiences about the professional careers of the interviewees and were not 
focused on opinion or conjecture.  
The research methodology used to capture the qualitative data for this analysis 
falls within the realm of phenomenological research. The primary goal of this type of 
research is to capture a “lived experience” (Ballad & Bawalan, 2012, p. 2) of a particular 
phenomenon. The phenomenon in this particular instance is that of the Defense 
Acquisition System and the interaction of the PM and KO throughout the acquisition life 
cycle. The objective in using this research methodology is to capture what is actually 
happening in the PM shops currently and to see how well that is working for those who 
are tasked with procuring the products and services that support our nation’s military. 
Through the eyes of the interviewees, we gained a unique inside-out perspective, 
providing highly useful research data. The most suited tool for analyzing our data sets 
obtained through this research method was interpretive analysis.  
The interpretive analysis method is a process by which the transcripts from the 
interviews are reduced and refined to data points that support the findings (Chapter IV). 
According to a 2010 presentation by C. Ballad and R. Bawalan, this process includes four 
sequential steps used to reduce the raw interview transcripts into a structured set of 
“emerging themes” (Ballad & Bawalan, 2012, p. 12); for the purposes of this research, 
we call these common themes. Also according to Ballad and Bawalan, these common 
themes need support from illustrative data extracted from raw interviews. The first step in 
our process was an initial review of the transcript data and the taking of notes. The 
second step involved reviewing the transcripts with notes to develop “common threads.” 
Common threads are concise phrases that contain enough particularity to remain 
grounded and enough abstractions to offer conceptual understanding. In the third step, we 
examined the threads and grouped them together by similarities and began the 
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identification of a structure helpful in highlighting converging ideas. The last step was to 
create a structure showing major and minor themes supported by illustrative data extracts 
(Ballad & Bawalan, 2012, p. 8). 
The primary objective of this paper, as the title states, is to determine to what 
degree early and continuous communication between the PM and KO impact the success 
of the Defense Acquisition System. To address this question effectively, we developed 
secondary research questions to support our primary analysis. The first question is: What 
is the current success/failure rate of Army acquisitions and why? This is important to lay 
the foundation that for later use to measure against when determining the impacts of 
PM/KO collaboration. The second question is: What are the issues with RFPs/contracts 
that are significantly affecting program performance? This question is important when 
looking at the root cause of problems and failures. The third question is: Does current 
acquisition policy, law, and regulation impact the success/failure rates of contract 
execution? This data set is important to the analysis in that it helps to understand the 
framework within which these two functional areas operate to aid in identifying the 
current state of DOD acquisitions.  
From the preceding research questions, we used an analysis matrix method to 
determine the necessary data required to adequately answer the questions. We extracted 
quantitative data from several public sources including the USD(AT&L) annual report on 
the performance of the Defense Acquisition System and the OSD office of Performance 
Assessments and Root Cause Analysis. This statistical data was used to show the current 
status and trends of the performance of the DAS. Qualitative data was extracted from 
interview transcripts generated from the interview questions (see Appendix). 
A. COMMUNICATION PROCESS AND TEAMS 
The essence of government programs revolves around teams, such as the 
integrated acquisition team. Our primary research question is analyzing that relationship 
between the PM and KO and how communication affects the successfulness of 
contracting and ultimately of the program. The verbal and written communication forms 
are what most people think of when talking about communicating. There are, however, 
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other variables that influence how effective that communication is. First, we examine the 
basics of communication, then discuss variables that affect the degree of success, and, 
finally, we look at effective team building. 
At its very foundation, communication is the process of sharing information that 
involves one person generating a message to another person or to a group of people with 
the intent of everyone having a common understanding of the message. Johnson asserts in 
his Handbook of Interpersonal Communication that “to be complete, the process must 
have the following three basic elements” (Johnson, Handbook of Interpersonal 
Communication, Organization Studies 24 (2003) as cited in Certo, & Certo, 2006, p. 
330): source/encoder, signal, and decoder/destination. 
The source/encoder is the person originating the information prior to sharing. 
Encoding the information puts it into an easily understandable format so that the person 
receiving the information readily understands. Examples of encoding include email, 
information papers, and graphical presentations such as PowerPoint slides for meetings. 
The signal is the process by which the encoded information transmits to the 
receiver. The signal could be verbal or in writing. 
The decoder/destination is the person or persons receiving the information 
transmitted by the source. The message is decoded, or the person or persons who receive 
it interpret its meaning. 
To increase the likelihood that communication is successful, the experience of the 
sender (encoder) and the receiver (decoder) should be at a similar level. If the sender and 
receiver have overlapping experience as illustrated in Figure 5, the probability is high that 
the communication process will be successful.  
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Figure 5.  Overlapping Field of Experience Communication Model 
 
From Certo, S. C., & Certo S. T. (2006). Modern management. Upper Saddle River, NJ: 
Prentice Hall. 
From the standpoint of contracting officer and program manager Communication, 
their field of experience should be overlapping to ensure success throughout the 
Acquisition process. Without overlapping fields of experience, the chances of successful 
communications diminish where the meaning of the information the sender intends to 
share with the receiver is lost during the decoding process. 
Alex Pentland reported in an article titled, The New Science of Building Great 
Teams, published in the Harvard Business Review (2012, pp. 2 - 3), that MIT conducted 
several studies of team dynamics to determine the “it factor” that made teams 
exceptionally effective. They were able to gather quantitative data by using “electronic 
badges that collected data on their individual [participants] communication behavior - 
tone of voice, body language, whom they talked to and how much” (Pentland, 2012, p. 
3). What they found was that the key to high performance is linked to communication 
(Pentland, 2012, p. 15). This data is important to our study because it shows empirical 
evidence in a quantifiable way that supports how crucial communication is to successful 
team dynamics. Additionally, the data illustrates how communication takes place at many 
different levels—not just in the written or verbal message itself.  
B. THREE INTEGRATIVE PILLARS OF SUCCESS (TIPS) 
Complementing the communications process is the Three Integrative Pillars of 
Success (TIPS). Developed in 2010, by E. Cory Yoder as an assessment and management 
tool for planning and executing contingency contracting operations, TIPS was first 
published in Phase Zero Operations for Integrative Planning (Yoder, 2010) and again in 
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PZCO-Phase Zero Contracting Operations (Yoder, 2012). Originally, the three 
integrative pillars included personnel, platforms, and protocols. Updates to the model in 
2013 added authorization and appropriation to the foundation of the three pillars. The 
premise of this addition was that without congressional authorizations and the resultant 
appropriations, contracting actions could not be executed. For this paper’s analysis, we 
only focus on the three pillars. Used with the Communications Process model, Interview 
Data Extrapolation model, interpretive phenomenological analysis (IPA) method, and 
Common Theme Analysis, TIPS rounds-out our Data Analysis Framework that we use in 
conducting the data analysis presented in Chapter IV. 
We show that the Three Integrative Pillars of Success as shown in Figure 6 is 
considered to be at the center of successful communications between the program 
manager and contracting officer to ensure a robust and collaborative environment within 
the Integrated Acquisition Team tasked with translating requirements into effective 
contracts.  
Figure 6.  TIPS Model 
 
From Yoder, E. C. (2010). Phase zero operations for contingency and expeditionary 
contracting—Keys to fully integrating contracting into operational planning and 




The first pillar of the Three Integrative Pillars of Success is “personnel.” “This 
pillar is the critical link amongst personnel, rank, position, credential, and capability” (E. 
C. Yoder, personal communication, July 22, 2015). The Communication Protocol for the 
Integrated Acquisition Team model (Figure 7) requires the right mix of team members 
and skill sets, program management, contracting, engineering, functional expertise, and 
user involvement to ensure successful communications within the team.  
Figure 7.  Communications Protocol for the Integrated Acquisition Team 
 
From Engelbeck, R. M. (2002). Acquisition management. Vienna, VA: Management. 
Open lines of communication ensure a complete understanding of user 
requirements necessary to develop a request for proposal (RFP) that will result in a legal 
and binding contract between the Army and the service provider. As discussed in Chapter 
I, the objective of an Integrated Acquisition Team is to “reach agreement on the strategy 
and plan by identifying and resolving issues early, understanding the issues and the 
rationale for the approach, and finally, documenting a quality deliverable(s) that is 
acceptable to all organizational levels the first time” (COL H. Culclasure, personal 




The second pillar of the Three Integrative Pillars of Success is “platforms” which 
consists of the “hardware and tangible software systems that provide for analysis, 
decision-making, production, management, and communication” (E.C. Yoder, personal 
communication, July 22, 2015). The Army relies on two automated systems used to 
support contracting writing: the Procurement Defense Desktop (PD2) and the Standard 
Procurement System (SPS); both PD2 and SPS support the Department of Defense 
paperless acquisition initiative. Providing visibility of procurement data to Congress is 
the Federal Procurement Data System – next generation (FPDS-NG). The intent of 
FPDS-NG is to measure and provide an assessment of federal procurements for contracts 
over $3K; FPDS-NG reports on the dollars spent to meet the goals of the Small Business 
Administration, and documents full and open competition procedures used in the 
acquisition process. Although platforms are necessary for the total success of TIPS for 
the purposes of this research, platforms is of lesser significance. 
3. Protocols 
The third pillar of TIPS is “protocols.” Protocols includes the rules, decision-
making framework, policies, and business models necessary to achieve the desired 
outcome (E. C. Yoder, personal communication, July 22, 2015), and describes what 
should be done and how to influence an outcome. As discussed in Chapter II, the FAR, 
DFARS, DOD 5000 Series, and DAG are part of the protocols’ pillar. The protocols’ 
pillar has an influence on Integrated Acquisition Teams and can strongly relate to the 
personnel pillar. The Overlapping Field of Experience Communication Model (identified 
in Figure 5) and the Communications Protocol for the Integrated Acquisition Team model 
(identified in Figure 7) both lend themselves to the protocols’ pillar of the TIPS model.  
As part of our data analysis framework, the Three Integrative Pillars of Success is 
considered to be at the center of successful communications between the program 
manager and contracting officer to ensure a robust and collaborative environment within 
the Integrated Acquisition Team tasked with translating requirements into effective 
contracts. 
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C. INTERVIEW DATA EXTRAPOLATION 
As part of the data gathering process, we conducted interviews with Department 
of the Army Civilians and Soldiers who are members of the Army Acquisition Corps, 
working in Program Management and Contract Management career fields. The 
methodology we followed for examining interview responses can be defined as Data 
extrapolation. To support this methodology, we used Microsoft Excel to capture the 
responses of each interview question, and we conducted analysis using a simple pivot 
table. We categorized responses based on criteria specific to the question being asked and 
scored based on an individual’s response. Responses were counted and their frequency 
distribution displayed as either a bar chart or a pie chart, which are provided in the 
Interview Analysis section of Chapter IV. As an example, the graphs in Figures 8 and 9 
depict responses to interview question number 3 where we asked: Where has 
communication, or lack thereof, between the PM and KO been a contributing factor to 
the failure of an Army Acquisition (Failure being an APB Breach, cost overrun, schedule 
slip)? Please provide specific examples. 




Figure 9.  Pie Chart of Responses to Interview Question 3 
 
 
In this example, of the nine Acquisition Professionals that we interviewed, seven 
responded to this question saying that no empirical existed to prove that lack of 
communication was a contributing factor to program failure. The two individuals, who 
responded that lack of communication was a contributing factor to program failure, 
supported their responses with anecdotal data based on their individual experiences. This 
research team was unable to confirm with factual evidence that in fact the lack of 
communication was a contributing factor to the programs failures. 
Twelve interview questions were developed and designed using the interpretive 
phenomenological analysis method. This will support this research and analysis of the 
primary and secondary research questions: 
PRIMARY: To what degree does early and ongoing communication between the 
program manager and contracting officer, impact the success or failure of Army 
acquisition programs? 
SECONDARY: Are problems with RFPs and Contracts related to poor 
communication and collaboration between the KO and PM? 
SECONDARY: Does current acquisition policy, law, training, and regulation 
impact success/failure rates of contract execution? 
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We use the results of this data extrapolation and examination to support our 
Common Theme Analysis and assists with synthesizing recurring elements of interview 
responses; which we discuss in detail in Chapters IV and V. 
D. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we showed how we performed our analysis against our chosen 
models and framework. We first identified the basic foundation for communications as 
well as some new data regarding observable and recordable communication interactions 
as they relate to team dynamics. Then, with the TIPS model, we sought to apply a 
framework to which we could analyze the current acquisition environment against 
personnel, platforms, and protocols. Finally, we reviewed how our research team chose to 
analyze the data received during our interview process, showing common themes and 
general observations among the respondents. In Chapter IV, we present the findings of 
our data analysis. Statistical evidence is presented that shows current performance 
metrics of the Defense Acquisition System and findings of interview data that provide 
common themes dealing with PM/KO communication that are evaluated against the TIPS 
and communications models discussed. 
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IV. FINDINGS AND RESULTS 
This chapter presents the quantitative and qualitative data collected as a part of 
this research. We use the framework outlined in Chapter III to analyze the data to 
determine whether or not a problem exists within the DAS, to what degree any problems 
may be tied to contracting, and the impact communication between the PM and KO has 
on those problems. Quantitative data in the form of DAS statistics (Cost, Schedule, and 
Performance), PARCA reports, and a case study are presented to validate the existence of 
a problem and to provide grounds for the purpose of this research. Common themes 
extracted from interview data will comprise the qualitative data set. These themes were 
extracted using the IPA method outlined in Chapter III. The published baselines of the 
Schramm communication model (Schramm, The Process and Effects of Mass 
Communication, as cited in Certo, & Certo, 2006, p. 332) and the Yoder TIPS model are 
compared against the current themes. From these comparisons, we pose 
recommendations to improve key areas, bringing the system as a whole closer to the 
models for success being used for comparison. 
As stated previously, success is measured in terms of delivering a suitable, 
effective, and supportable capability to the warfighter, on time and within budget. Failure 
to the contrary is measured by shortfalls in these areas. It is important to recognize, 
however, that a single failure marker in a program does not mean that the program as a 
whole has failed. It generally takes repeated and un-remedied failures to cancel a 
program. For example, a program may have a baseline budget breach due to a problem 
with a critical technology, and after a re-baseline, the program delivers a much-needed 
effective capability. While this would display a cost failure marker due to the program 
baseline breach, it is the contention of these researchers that this program example would 
be considered an overall success.  
A. PERFORMANCE OF THE DEFENSE ACQUISITION SYSTEM 
The Performance of the Defense Acquisition System (DAS) is an annual report 
that is produced by the USD(AT&L) to capture current statistics and trends regarding 
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how well the Department of Defense is performing at acquiring goods and services for 
the country. The report covers metrics related to the three main trade-off elements: cost, 
schedule, and performance, as well as other supporting statistics and information. At the 
time of this writing, the latest version of the report is the 2014 edition. This section will 
present relevant statistical data from the report showing the current status of the 
success/failure markers being considered and the effects of communications on them. By 
showing that there is room for improvement in specific areas, the utility for research into 
contributing factors and grounds for providing recommendations is validated.  
1. Cost Growth as a Marker 
Cost growth, or rather the lack thereof, is a key marker for program success. 
Excessive cost growth leads to baseline breaches and in severe cases can trigger a Nunn-
McCurdy breach ultimately causing the cancellation of a program. Ineffective 
communications, meaning that the sender and receiver are not transferring information in 
a manner without loss, can often lead to cost growth. This can be caused by the selection 
of an ineffective contract type for the requirement, schedule slips due to missed 
deadlines, and a myriad of other potential causes. For the period covered by the 2014 
performance report, the Army showed a slight negative trend in development contract 
cost growth, at an amount slightly lower than the DOD-wide trend (Figure 10). This 
represents a slight increase, but essentially static, final-margin trend of about 6 percent, 
which per the report is statistically insignificant but is included here for completeness 
(OUSD[AT&L], 2014, p. 60). 
  
 43 
Figure 10.  Army Development Contract Cost-Growth and Final-Margin 
Trends (2000–2012) 
 
From Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics (OUSD[AT&L]). (2014, June 13). Performance of the Defense Acquisition 
System, 2014 annual report. Washington, DC: Author. Retrieved from 
http://bbp.dau.mil/docs/Performance-of-Defense-Acquisition-System-2014.pdf 
For the same period, the Army showed an increasing rate of production contract 
cost growth and a trend that is divergent with that of the DOD as a whole (Figure 11). 
This represents a final-margin trend that, according to the report, is statistically 
significant and peaks with the last data point sometime in 2010 with a value of just under 
17% and is “driven by [the] dominance of FFP [firm fixed price] contracts in this 
sample” (OUSD[AT&L], 2014, p. 68). 
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Figure 11.  Army Production Contract Cost-Growth and Final-Margin Trends 
(2004–2010) 
 
From Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics (OUSD[AT&L]). (2014, June 13). Performance of the Defense Acquisition 
System, 2014 annual report. Washington, DC: Author. Retrieved from 
http://bbp.dau.mil/docs/Performance-of-Defense-Acquisition-System-2014.pdf 
As previously stated, perhaps the biggest failure marker in acquisition programs is 
the occurrence of a Nunn-McCurdy breach. The Nunn-McCurdy Act of 1982 states that a 
“significant cost growth [breach] means … a percentage increase in the program 
acquisition unit cost of at least 15 percent over the … current baseline estimate; or at least 
30 percent over the … original baseline estimate. Critical cost growth [breach] means … 
a percentage increase in the program acquisition unit cost of at least 25 percent over the 
… current baseline estimate; or at least 50 percent over the … original baseline estimate.” 
(sec. (a) para. 4–5) Figure 12 shows the number of Nunn-McCurdy breaches for the years 
covered in the 2014 version of the annual report. Figure 13 shows the same data grouped 
by service rather than by year of breach. The number of breaches is clearly improving; 
however, breaches still do occur. Early communication cannot guarantee a flawless 
acquisition, but lack of communication creates an environment that causes problems that 
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can lead to a baseline breach. For example, on March 30, 2011 the Joint Tactical Radio 
System reported a critical Nunn-McCurdy breach to the USD(AT&L), which according 
to the root cause analysis was contributed to by the selection of a cost-plus contract type 
and the decision as part of the acquisition strategy to exclude Boing from the production 
contract (OASD[A], 2011c, p. 1). This type of failure will be reduced when the PM and 
KO are collaborating from program initiation on the acquisition strategy, contracting 
strategy, and the acquisition requirements package (ARP). Further data supporting this 
claim is presented in this chapter’s Section D, Interview Analysis.  
Figure 12.  Nunn-McCurdy MDAP Breaches per SAR Year (1997–2013) 
 
From Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics (OUSD[AT&L]). (2014, June 13). Performance of the Defense Acquisition 




Figure 13.  Nunn-McCurdy MDAP Breech Rates by Component (1997–2013) 
 
From Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics (OUSD[AT&L]). (2014, June 13). Performance of the Defense Acquisition 
System, 2014 annual report. Washington, DC: Author. Retrieved from 
http://bbp.dau.mil/docs/Performance-of-Defense-Acquisition-System-2014.pdf 
2. Schedule Growth as a Marker 
To determine the current success rates of the Defense Acquisition System 
Schedule, the second marker we investigated was schedule growth. Without effective 
communications between the PM and KO, schedule growth is highly likely to occur. This 
can be caused by failure to collaborate on the requirements package, causing a necessary 
revision that is not planned for in the program timeline—as well as many other examples 
not listed here. The schedule growth for Army development contracts has shown marked 
improvement. With a trend that shows the schedule growth to be decreasing and 
converging with the DOD wide statistic, the last data point shows the Army schedule 
growth for development contracts to be just below zero years in 2012, meaning that the 
contracts are completed ahead of schedule (Figure 14). This data is, according to the 





Figure 14.  Army Development Contract Schedule-Growth Trends (2000–
2012) 
 
From Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics (OUSD[AT&L]). (2014, June 13). Performance of the Defense Acquisition 
System, 2014 annual report. Washington, DC: Author. Retrieved from 
http://bbp.dau.mil/docs/Performance-of-Defense-Acquisition-System-2014.pdf 
For the same period, the metrics also show that the Army has an increasing 
production schedule growth trend that has surpassed and is divergent from the DOD total 
trend in 2009. The last reported data point, in 2010, shows a slightly higher than 0.5 
(year) schedule growth for Army production contracts (Figure 15). According to the 
report (OUSD[AT&L], 2014 p. 70), this metric is not statistically significant but is 
included here for completeness. 
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Figure 15.   Army Production Contract Schedule-Growth Trends (2005–2010) 
  
From Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics (OUSD[AT&L]). (2014, June 13). Performance of the Defense Acquisition 
System, 2014 annual report. Washington, DC: Author. Retrieved from 
http://bbp.dau.mil/docs/Performance-of-Defense-Acquisition-System-2014.pdf 
3. Performance as a Marker 
The third maker of success/failure that we examined is performance. While the 
performance of a system is the responsibility of the program manager, without effective 
communications between the PM and KO creating a legally binding contract that captures 
requirements representing the desired performance is difficult. The KO is tasked with 
writing contracts for procurable requirements, and, as such, they must be verifiable. 
When a collaborative approach between the PM and KO is not used, the resulting 
requirements package contains a patchwork of the original requirements and language 
ensuring that they are verifiable. Once produced, the lack of continuity in the 
requirements package can be seen in the form of missing capability, or less than desired 
performance in the areas of suitability, survivability, and maintainability. Metrics show 
that the Army has done exceptionally well at developing effective systems, especially in 
light of the performance of “Other DOD” systems. It is worth noting, however, that the 
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Army has seen a reduction in the number effective programs over the last rating period of 
the report (2009–2013) (Figure 16).  
Figure 16.  Percent of Military Department Programs Rated Effective (1984–
2013) 
 
From Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics (OUSD[AT&L]). (June 13, 2014). Performance of the Defense Acquisition 
System, 2014 annual report. Washington, DC: Author. Retrieved from 
http://bbp.dau.mil/docs/Performance-of-Defense-Acquisition-System-2014.pdf 
Metrics for suitability paint a different picture, however, in that while showing 
slight improvement in the last rating cycle (2009–2013), the percentage of suitable 
systems is slightly below 75%. While this may not be representative of an overall failure 
of the procurement system, it does show that many programs still struggle with this 
marker of success/failure (Figure 17) (OUSD[AT&L], 2014, p. 56).  
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Figure 17.  Percent of MDAPs by Military Department Rated Suitable (1984–
2013) 
 
From Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics (OUSD[AT&L]). (June 13, 2014). Performance of the Defense Acquisition 
System, 2014 annual report. Washington, DC: Author. Retrieved from 
http://bbp.dau.mil/docs/Performance-of-Defense-Acquisition-System-2014.pdf 
Overall, the Army is doing well with development contracts in terms of cost and 
schedule. On the other hand, production contracts not only need improvement but also 
trend reversals in these areas (Cost and Schedule). The data presented for Army program 
performance was not considered for production versus Development; however, 
collectively the programs being procured are highly effective and only about 75 percent 
suitable (OUSD[AT&L], 2014, p. 56). This represents another key success/failure marker 
that has plenty of room for improvement. 
B. PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENTS AND ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS 
The following section examines several reports and data from the office of 
PARCA to investigate contributing factors to poor program performance. This would be 
indicated by the success/failure markers: cost, schedule, and performance, discussed 
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previously. With evidence that contracting problems, the details of which will be laid out 
in the following paragraphs, lead to problems with program performance, a correlation 
between communication effectiveness and contracting product outcomes becomes useful 
for identifying recommendations for improving program performance.  
1. Enterprise Resource Planning 
An analysis of enterprise resource planning (ERP) Systems was initiated in 
response to the GAO report entitled, “DOD Business Transformation – Improved 
Management Oversight of Business System Modernization Efforts Needed” dated 
October 2010. The GAO report outlined a 28%–641% cost growth for the reviewed 
programs based on a Milestone A, the decision review preceding the technology 
maturation and risk reduction phase, estimate (2010). According to the OASD[A] office 
for PARCA (2011), the ERP programs from inception were troubled due to the failure to 
completely understand the requirements and the complexity of the DOD business 
processes. Their report states that because of this poor understanding, the acquisition 
strategy is flawed with unrealistic cost and schedule baselines. Additionally, they found 
that this issue is compounded by policy requiring the use of a FFP contract for acquisition 
of ERPs. FFP contracts are completely ineffective for acquiring systems where a 
thorough understanding of the final product is not well understood right from program 
inception. This presents a historical example of a PM/KO communication channel that 
was ineffective. Effective PM/KO collaboration in this example should have captured the 
lack of definition of the program requirements in the acquisition strategy and then 
coupled that to a contracting strategy in support of the evolution of those requirements. 
Additionally, a collaborative approach to obtain a waiver for the fixed-price contract type 
policy should have been pursued to increase the opportunity for program success. The 
report also stated that the timing of the system integration contract being released prior to 
the complete blueprinting of the entire business process was a contributing factor as well. 
Additionally, the use of time and materials (T&M) contracts for system modifications 
eliminated any incentive structure for the contractor to reduce workforce and cost. 
Finally, due to the reporting requirements for the FFP contract vehicles, overall 
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situational awareness was reduced and earned-value data was limited, if available at all 
(OASD[A], 2011a, pp. 1–3). 
The ERP case is a good example of how a lack of communication and 
collaboration between the PM and KO can lead to the KO’s poor understanding of the 
status of the requirements definition process. This can lead to the improper use of 
contract types for different phases of the acquisition. This leads ultimately to poor 
program performance and, in this case, causes a baseline breach.  
2. Global Hawk 
According to a 2011 report put out by the OASD[A] PARCA office, an analysis 
into the Global Hawk program reveals that contracting causes led to more than a 25% 
increase in the program acquisition unit cost (PAUC) over the 2007 baseline. They find 
that while the primary cause for cost growth in this program is the addition of 
requirements and the deferral of development on certain known requirements, these 
problems were exacerbated due to the contract structure the government was “unable to 
motivate Northrup-Grumman Corporation to deliver on-time products of acceptable 
quality” (OASD[A], 2011b, pp. 1–3). Stated another way, the contract type (strategy) 
employed by the acquisition team in the acquisition strategy was ineffective at driving 
contractor results. This failure to drive contractor performance leads to schedule slips and 
performance issues with the delivered products.  
3. JTRS 
The Joint Tactical Radio System reported a critical Nunn-McCurdy breach to the 
USD(AT&L) on March 30, 2011 (OASD[A], 2011c, p. 1). As published in a 2011 report 
by the OASD[A] PARCA office, the program experienced a 90% increase in PAUC over 
their current baseline, which was largely attributed by the Army to a decrease in the 
number of radios ordered. PARCA determined the root cause to be an inadequate analysis 
of an affordable quantity of radios to establish the program baseline. Additional findings 
indicate that this issue was compounded by the fact that the requirements were poorly 
defined from program inception, and the cost-plus contract type issued to Boeing, along 
with the explicit exclusion from production, did not adequately incentivize them to 
 53 
reduce unit production costs (OASD[A], 2011c, pp. 1–2). In this example, the acquisition 
team failed to create an acquisition strategy that included contract type selection 
(strategy) that would effectively reduce cost risk to the program.  
4. Big Picture 
Figure 18 highlights the root cause analyses performed by PARCA, both statutory 
and discretionary between 2010 and 2012.  
Figure 18.  PARCA Root Causes Analyses (Statutory and Discretionary, 
2010–2012) 
 
From Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics (OUSD[AT&L]). (June 28, 2013). Performance of the Defense Acquisition 
System, 2013 annual report. Washington, DC: Author. Retrieved from 
http://bbp.dau.mil/doc/Report_on_the_Performance_of_the_Def_Acq_System.pdf 
Poor management performance to include contractual incentives was present as a 
root cause in greater than 50% of the Nunn-McCurdy breaches analyzed by PARCA for 
this period (OUSD[AT&L], 2013, p. 34). This proves that contracting does play a role in 
program success. This is not meant to imply, however, that the contracting incentives are 
the sole responsibility of the KO, but rather this emphasizes the importance of a 
collaborative solution that must be reached between the PM and KO with respect to 
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acquisition type, execution capabilities, and risk. This evidence speaks to the point that 
while poor or lacking communication between the PM and KO is not likely to be the sole 
cause of a program breach or failure, it is likely that improvement in this area will reduce 
the chances that a program will fail for this particular reason.  
C. CASE STUDY 
Experience shows that there is disparity amongst contracting shops with regard to 
how communication works throughout the Army Contracting Command. Case in point: 
In 2010, the Software Engineering Center Tactical Logistics Directorate (SEC-TLD) at 
Fort Lee, Virginia was informed by the National Capital Region Contracting Center 
(NCRCC) that all logistics information technology (LOG IT) contracts would need to 
transition to a new contracting agency according to one of the authors, Loya. The 
Communication Electronics Command, Software Engineering Center (CECOM, SEC) 
directed that SEC-TLD take the action to move the LOG IT contracts to the Army 
Contracting Center - Aberdeen Proving Ground (ACC-APG) for all contracting 
requirements necessary to support the LOG IT systems. Because NCRCC was closing, 
the determination was made through an agreement amongst NCRCC, ACC-APG, and 
CECOM, SEC: The existing Property Book Unit Supply Enhanced (PBUSE) contract 
(with one option year remaining) would not transition but, instead, ACC-APG would 
compete with a new contract that would be awarded by February 1, 2011, versus trying to 
manage the last contract option year that remained under the existing PBUSE contract. 
All documentation and files associated with PBUSE were sent to ACC-APG on May 21, 
2010 and despite efforts by SEC-TLD to open the lines of communication with ACC-
APG there was “radio silence” until July 27, 2010. When the lines of communication 
were finally opened, the SEC-TLD acquisition team was directed not to communicate 
directly with the ACC-APG contracting officer; instead, all communications would go 
through a contracting analyst located at the CECOM, SEC headquarters. This process is 
contrary to regulatory direction and guidance listed in the FAR and the DOD 5000 Series. 
This stifling of communications fractured the personnel pillar of TIPS and disconnected 
the overlapping field of experience communication model (Figure 19) that is desired 
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between the PM (SEC-TLD) and the KO (ACC-APG) and, as Schramm (as cited in 
Certo, & Certo, 2006, p. 331) suggests, is required to ensure successful communications. 
Figure 19.  Overlapping Field of Experience Communication 
  
From Certo, S. C., & Certo, S. T. (2006). Modern management. Upper Saddle River, NJ: 
Prentice Hall. 
There was never a positive communications protocol between SEC-TLD and the 
KO at ACC-APG. The process was disorganized and convoluted without a dedicated 
contracting officer assigned to support the life cycle of the PBUSE contract effort. As 
evidenced in Figure 20, when the lines of communication were finally opened on July 27, 
2010, the process of developing the acquisition requirements package started with less 
than six months left until the proposed award date of February 1, 2011. Realizing that 
ACC-APG was not going to get a new contract in place before the period of performance 
ended under the original NCRCC contract, arrangements were made for NCRCC to 
execute the last remaining option year on the existing contract and then ACC-APG would 







Figure 20.  PBUSE PPSS Re-compete Timeline 2012 
 
From W. Sarvay, personal communications, August 19, 2015. 
After 21 plus months of effort, a new PBUSE contract was finally awarded on 
February 13, 2012. The period of performance for the new contract was for one base year 
plus one option, and it was awarded to the vendor with the lowest price technically 
acceptable (LPTA) proposal. LPTA is advantageous to the government as long as the 
price offered is realistic. In the case of the PBUSE contract award, the price was too low, 
resulting in the contractor being challenged to attract and hire personnel with the requisite 
qualifications needed for the salaries the company was able to pay. To remedy the 
problem, the KO was forced to modify the contract and to add additional funds to cover 
the extra costs; this allowed exceptions to some of the qualifications and the staffing 
timetables to compensate for the vendor’s inability to staff properly. It was unilaterally 
decided that the best contract vehicle to pursue was a cost plus fixed fee (CPFF). The KO 
would accomplish this with no consideration given to the SEC-TLD recommendation that 
a Time & Materials (T&M) type contract was better suited for the type of work in a Post 
Production System Support environment.  
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Different contract types are available for a reason. For example, T&M 
(Labor Hour) type contacts have been very effective when considering the 
nature of the services required to support the LOG IT systems; it affords 
flexibility for the PM to add or reduce resources as needed and is less 
costly to administer over a CPFF type of contract. SEC-TLD had a very 
successful history with T&M contracts; which was attributed to strong and 
thorough surveillance plans. (A. Ford, personal communications, April 21, 
2015) 
No sooner was the PBUSE contract awarded in February 2012 than actions for the 
re-compete of that contract began. This was to ensure that when the one option period of 
performance was complete that a new contract would be in place. Again, the process or 
lack thereof that SEC-TLD was forced to follow in working with ACC-APG failed. As 
shown in Figure 21, SEC-TLD was forced to execute a six-month extension covering the 
period February 10, 2014–August 9, 2014; then it also executed a second six-month 
extension from August 10, 2014–February 9, 2015 which cost SEC-TLD $5.2M to 
execute (W. Sarvay, personal communications, August 19, 2015).  
Figure 21.  PBUSE PPSS Re-compete Timeline 2014 
 
From W. Sarvay, personal communications, August 19, 2015. 
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In December 2014, a CPFF contract was awarded with a base year plus two 
option years at a cost of $3M. Although the contract was awarded as a LPTA, there was a 
difference in this award over the first PBUSE contract awarded under ACC-APG: It 
followed the guidance of Better Buying Power 2.0 and the SEC-TLD successfully argued 
that Technically Acceptable selection criteria needed to be defined to ensure that the 
services provided by the contractor would be of adequate quality. This effort resulted in a 
contract awarded to a vendor that was capable of performing the work required and 
staffing the project with personnel that had the requisite skill sets to perform the work. 
As evidenced in this PBUSE example, the failure to effectively communicate 
between the PM and KO resulted in additional costs and schedule slips for SEC-TLD. 
Not only were there additional costs to allow the contractor to properly staff the contract, 
but there were additional unplanned costs associated with two contract extensions in 2014 
to allow for ACC-APG to release the RFP, conduct the source selection, and award the 
new contract. The cost of the two contract extensions ($5.2M) coupled with the cost of 
the contract that was awarded in December 2014 ($3M) resulted in an additional $2M of 
taxpayer. This could have been avoided if the process that ACC-APG enforced was more 
inclusive of the entire integrated acquisition team, instead of the one that was followed 
that alienated and disenfranchised SEC-TLD from the effort. 
At the beginning of FY15, oversight and management of the LOG IT transitioned 
from the SEC to Program Executive Office, Enterprise Information Systems (PEO-EIS), 
product director, Logistics Information Systems (PD LIS). Along with this transition, all 
associated contracts supporting the LOG IT systems were moved from ACC-APG to 
Army Contracting Center - Rock Island (ACC-RI). A stark contrast to ACC-APG, ACC-
RI has robust communications with their customers. As shared by PD LIS, there were 
two dedicated KOs assigned to support the five systems in the portfolio (R. Daniels, 
personal communications, June 3, 2015). Before the contracts transferred, the entire 
contracts division (division chief, team chief, and staff) from ACC-RI visited PEO EIS to 
meet with the LIS Product Director (PD). They discussed how the transition would 
happen and what the expectations for how the contracting team envisioned the 
relationship being formed between the two organizations would be structured. According 
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to one of the authors, Loya, the very first comment from the division chief at the start of 
the meeting was that customer satisfaction was first and foremost for his team. The 
division chief articulated that they were there to provide the best possible service to 
ensure a legal and binding contract was put into place that satisfied the PM’s 
requirements and enabled success. This attitude by the ACC-RI team aligns directly with 
the guiding principles outlined in both Figure 22 and in the FAR. This is the framework 
for the integrated acquisition team to leverage throughout the acquisition process.  
Figure 22.  Standards of Performance for the Acquisition System 
 
 
From Engelbeck, R. M. (2002). Acquisition management. Vienna, VA: Management 
Concepts. 
There are weekly meetings between the KO and PM to discuss the performance of 
current contracts and any requirements for upcoming contracts. On a quarterly basis, the 
division chief, team chief, and the KO travel from Rock Island to PEO-EIS and conduct 
an in-progress review (IPR) with the PD. The most positive aspect of working with ACC-
RI over ACC-APG is that the KO advises the PD and makes best recommendations 
within the framework of contract law and the FAR for the PD to consider. Currently the 
PD is in the process of developing a PWS for a program management system support 
(PMSS) contract re-compete and a separate PWS for a System Sustainment contract re-
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compete. For each effort, the KO has been involved every step of the way providing 
guidance, recommendations, options on contract type, and guidance on how to properly 
document and justify the type of contract the PD wishes to pursue. This approach to 
customer satisfaction aligns directly the Key Elements of Customer Satisfaction as shown 
in Figure 23. 
Figure 23.  Key Elements of Customer Satisfaction 
 
From Engelbeck, R. M. (2002). Acquisition management. Vienna, VA: Management 
Concepts. 
The contrast of how ACC-APG and CC-RI choose to communicate with their 
customers is very evident. The APG approach to customer service is that communication 
with the customer is non-existent and that the customer had no say in how their 
requirements will be satisfied. The RI approach embraces full and open communications, 
and the customer is integral to making the right decisions to ensure that requirements are 
satisfied. ACC-RI provides dedicated KOs to support PD LIS that has resulted in 
fostering a positive and collaborative working relationship between teams. There has not 
been one instance where the PD has made a request of the KO and the KO has 
immediately said no. Instead, the KO takes the request, conducts the research, asks 
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questions, and formulates an answer based on both what is in the realm of possibility and 
what is prescribed by contract law and the FAR. 
D. INTERVIEW ANALYSIS 
The interviewees for this research were selected based on their expert knowledge 
and real-world experience in either the Program Management or Contracting fields within 
the DOD. Participants from ere selected and interviews for this research from: program 
executive offices, Executive Director White Sands Missile Range (Former Mine-
Resistant Ambush Protected [MRAP] PM), Program Management offices, product 
director offices, PEO EIS Technology Application Office in Fort Detrick, Maryland, and 
local contracting offices at Fort Lee, Virginia, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and White Sands 
Missile Range. We conducted nine interviews with six of these from the PM functional 
area and three from contracting. This disparity is due to subject matter expert availability 
and access. Chapter V contains recommendations for further study with a possible 
consideration of expanding this data set.  
From the interview data collected, the interpretation process outlined in Chapter 
III was used to extract the following common themes. Themes appear in order of 
relevance to the topic of this research. Each is compared against the Schramm 
communications model (Schramm, The Process and Effects of Mass Communication, as 
cited in Certo, & Certo, 2006, p. 332), then against the Yoder TIPS model, and finally 
recommendations are made for better alignment of the theme with the models for success.  
1. Theme 1 - Communication 
Effective communication between the PM and KO is absolutely critical to the 
success of any procurement. Effective communication is that which exchanges 
information with minimal loss or distortion. This is especially true prior to contract 
award. This point was agreed upon by all interviewees (Figure 24), and it generated some 




Figure 24.  Interview Question 1 Responses 
 
NOTE: The interview question for this response is, “How does communication between 
the contracting officer (KO) and the program manager (PM) affect the process of 
developing the acquisition requirements package, publishing the solicitation, and 
awarding a contract in a timely manner? Please provide examples.” 
In one case, the interviewee went as far as to say, “[they have] never seen a 
procurement work without high comms [communications], even with good 
communication some problems will still exist, but without it they are certain” (P. Mann, 
personal communication, May 14, 2015). According to our interviewees, these 
communications are accomplished best in one of two ways. The first is to have the KO 
tightly integrated with the PM team. This can manifest in several different ways with 
similar results. Whether it is the PM and KO literally sitting 15 feet from one another or 
as part of an Integrated Product Team, physical proximity matters. When physical 
proximity may not be present, the second is to have customers tightly aligned and 
coupled with goals and outcomes. This is accomplished best by assigning a team of 
contracting professionals to a requiring activity, which aligns their goals with that of the 
supported organization. Conversely, when contracting professionals are assigned to 
multiple and different requiring activities and moved from procurement to procurement, 
goal alignment and continuity may be difficult. This highlights the issue of contracting 
resource availability. Not only has there been a marked reduction in the number of 
contracting professionals available to perform this work, but there is also a significant 
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amount of knowledge has been lost due to an aging workforce that is not being 
replenished quickly enough.  
Using the Schramm communication model (Schramm, The Process and Effects of 
Mass Communication, as cited in Certo, & Certo, 2006, p. 332) as a critical component 
supporting the TIPS pillars (Figure 25) to examine this common theme, it can be determined 
that the close physical proximity of the PM and KO will improve the quality of 
communication by shortening the signal path. As with any signal transmission, attenuation 
can occur over distance, making the most pure signal that which is closest to the source. The 
field of experience overlap is also increased by close physical proximity. The PM and KO 
working together daily will develop a similar knowledge set that is based not only on their 
backgrounds but also on their intimate knowledge of the current program. This makes the 
foundation for communication more solid. This similar knowledge set will also reduce 
problems introduced by the encoding/decoding process by building a common lexicon that is 
inherent when working in close proximity to one another.  
Figure 25.  Communication Model Overlaid with the TIPS Model  
 
After Certo, S. C., & Certo, S. T. (2006). Modern management. Upper Saddle River, NJ: 
Prentice Hall. After Yoder, E. C. (2010). Phase zero operations for contingency and 
expeditionary contracting—Keys to fully integrating contracting into operational 
planning and execution. (Report No. NPS-CM-10-160). Retrieved from 
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The communication theme represents a key component of the personnel pillar of 
the Yoder TIPS model. Having the right personnel in the correct organizational structure 
is key to enabling communication and collaboration. When designing an acquisition 
organization, extra care should be taken to embed the contracting professionals within 
that organizational structure, if possible. As previously stated, if the organization is not 
structured to embed contracting personnel within the program office, the over-arching 
organization must be structured such that contracting personnel are dedicated to a 
program office or requiring activity. This helps to ensure continuity of operations and 
increases the pride of ownership within the contracting team making communications and 
collaboration more likely. 
Effective communication and collaboration has been shown to produce amazing 
results for programs. For example, MRAP, 9 IDIQ contracts were put in place in under 
six months. These would sustain the government’s authority to ultimately execute over 
$50 billion dollars while simultaneously limiting liability to a couple million dollars (P. 
Mann, personal communication, May 14, 2015). 
2. Theme 2 - Performance 
“The responsibility for delivering a suitable, survivable, and sustainable capability 
rest squarely with the program manager” (P. Mann, personal communication, May 14, 
2015). The PM is chartered to ensure that the requirements are adequately defined and 
that the system built meets these requirements. It can be noted, however, that 
communication between the PM and KO will speed up the process and increase the 
quality of the acquisition products (examples are Performance Work Statement, 
Statement of Objectives, etc.). While the KO cannot change requirements, it is their 
responsibility to inform the PM in a timely manner of potential problems with the 
acquisition of the currently defined requirements. 
When considering that the development of requirements for a system is the sole 
responsibility of the requiring activity, it is important to remember that these 
requirements must be translated into a contract by the acquisition team. For this reason, it 
is absolutely critical to the acquisition that the technical requirements and performance 
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specifications are accurately transcribed from the end user all the way into the contract. 
The following potential pitfalls with the communication process required here can be 
identified when examining the Schramm communication model (Schramm, The Process 
and Effects of Mass Communication, as cited in Certo, & Certo, 2006, p. 332). In the 
model, we see that there is an encoding and a decoding process that is supported by the 
respective party’s field of experience. This translation process provides an opportunity 
for details or intent to be lost in translation, and it is for this very reason that requirements 
must be stated in measureable and unambiguous metrics.  
Ensuring program performance requires an effective protocol, or collection of 
protocols, as identified in Yoder’s TIPS model for successful organizations. This ensures 
that requirements are sufficiently translated and remain traceable back to the original user 
need. There are multiple methods used by the Systems Engineering discipline that are 
effective at translating user needs into procurable requirements and providing the 
traceability needed for successful contract execution. To name a few, quality function 
deployment (QFD) and house of quality (HOQ) are common. As part of a successful 
organization, a method should be selected early and well-defined within the requiring 
activity. 
3. Theme 3 - Contract Type 
The contract type selected for an acquisition is critical to its success. The contract 
type is used to manage risk, incentivize contractor performance, and manage program 
cost growth. The interviewees had much to say about this topic, and it presents an 
opportunity for further research to be discussed in Chapter V. The consensus, again 




Figure 26.  Interview Question 5 Responses 
 
NOTE: The interview question for this response is, “Does contract type (fixed-priced, 
cost-reimbursement or time and materials Contracts) have an effect on a programs 
performance? What trends can be attributed to a higher number of program failures when 
using one contract type over another? Is the contract type in question selected unilaterally 
(PM or KO), bilaterally (PM and KO), or required by policy? Please provide examples.” 
When it comes to selecting the contract type, most interviewees felt that a 
bilateral consensus between the PM and KO was the best method for selection. 
Ultimately, the contract type is the responsibility of the KO, and it should be selected 
with consideration for what the “PM can execute” (J. Kaiser, personal communication, 
May 13, 2015). There are, however, numerous factors that impact or mandate the use of a 
particular contract type. First is the law. Often times for a particular type of acquisition, 
commercial services for example, the type of contract vehicles that are permitted is 
limited. Second, there are other stakeholders that have “hands on the wheel,” (P. Mann, 
personal communication, May 14, 2015) though who these stakeholders are depends on 
the acquisition’s visibility and size. Third, the reviewing authority can refuse approval 
and require the KO to change the contract type prior to approval. Finally, different 
contract types seem to fall in and out of favor over time. Currently, we are entering a 
period of favor for “incentive-based contracts” (OUSD[AT&L], 2015, ch. 2), and often 
times there is severe pressure to utilize the favored contract type. There are waivers 
available for these non-regulatory policies. They are, however, often approved through 
similar chains as the approvals for the contracts themselves and the “distance from 
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Washington seems to be inversely related to the likelihood of waiver approval” (T. 
Byrnes, personal communication, May 8, 2015). 
In order to select the best contract type for the program, it is important to have bi-
directional communication between the KO and the PM to exchange requirements, rules, 
and regulations limiting the available contract types for a particular acquisition. With a 
bi-directional channel of communication open, a consensus should be reached between 
the two parties with the KO having the ultimate decision per their warranted authority.  
This key theme involves both pillars of Personnel and Protocol from Yoder’s 
TIPS model. First, selecting and executing the correct contract type requires that the right 
people be in the right place. Second, as previously stated, one of the biggest factors 
effecting the ultimate selection of the contract type is often outside the program office. 
Either program headquarters or the reviewing agency will require a certain contract type 
removing the ability of the PM and KO to select what is bilaterally agreed upon as the 
best option for the program. Additionally, guidance documents that often are explicitly 
written without intent to be directive in nature are interpreted by senior leaders as 
mandatory. Often these best practices or recommendations are written into the 
performance objectives of acquisition professionals, essentially turning them into 
concrete requirements that the PM and KO must make work for all programs.  
It is the conclusion of this research team that the contract type selected is critical 
to the success of program. For the proper contract type to be selected it is imperative that 
the PM and KO communicate and work together to decide what is legal and what will 
best meet the requirements of the program. Past this truth, however, a problem has been 
discovered that may be much more difficult to correct, and that is the problem of 
oversight influence. It is the job of the warranted KO to select and write the contract and 
make an attestation that it meets all legal requirements and represents the best value for 
the government. According to our interviews, however, there are often additional 
considerations when selecting the contract type. For example, as different contract types 
fall in and out of favor there is increased pressure to make that contract type work in all 
situations where not expressly prohibited by law. Additionally, service, command, and 
local policies are often written into the performance objectives of acquisition 
 68 
professionals linking their career success to the adherence to direction that was often 
never intended to be concrete in nature. These policies, and even the FAR, are written to 
be permissive in nature, meaning that if something is not expressly prohibited it is 
allowable.  
4. Theme 4 - Program Success/Failure 
Programs rarely fail due to a single cause, and, therefore, it is difficult to say with 
any statistical confidence that poor or lack of communication has led to increased 
program failure rates. “It can be hypothesized however that at least some failures could 
have been prevented by leveraging better collaboration to more effectively manage 
contract performance” (COL H. Culclasure, personal communication, April 16, 2015). 
The same hypothesis could easily be expanded to include the ARP, RFP, source 
selection, and award processes. There are several anecdotal examples of failure 
contributed to by poor or lack of communication, including the ERP use of a FFP 
contract type (COL H. Culclasure, personal communication, April 16, 2015). See the 
PARCA section previously discussed and the “lack of communication and understanding 
of the level of effort required, [which] was a key element in the overrun experienced by 
Unit Level Logistics System-Aviation (Enhanced) (ULLS-AE)” (A. Ford, personal 
communications, April 21, 2015). 
Communication is the bedrock of all functions that must take place within a 
program. While as noted previously, it would be an unlikely case for poor or lack of 
communication to be the sole cause of failure; effective communication is required to 
make the overall program successful. Recall that effective communication is defined as 
communication that relays the sender’s message to the receiver without distortion or loss. 
In addition to effective communication, it must be an ongoing effort, encompassing all 
relevant aspects of the acquisition. 
An organization, or program, as shown by Yoder’s TIPS model, requires all three 
pillars (personnel, platforms, and protocols) to work together in unison to ensure success. 
Via our research, we propose that these pillars are held together internally with effective 
and continuous communication (Figure 25). Personnel without communication do not 
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represent an organization; rather, it is a collection of individuals. Platforms without 
communication become a collection of independent components. Finally, protocols 
without communication become good ideas in the mind of one.  
5. Theme 5 - ARP Collaboration 
The percentage per annum of ARP’s rejected by the KO varied drastically in our 
interviews (Figure 27). On the low end, responses indicated that only 1–2 percent (J. 
Kaiser, personal communications, May 13, 2015) per year were rejected, and on the high 
end the responses indicate that the figure is somewhere in excess of 90% (T. Byrnes, 
personal communication, May 8, 2015). 
Figure 27.  Interview Question 6 Responses 
 
NOTE: The interview question for this response is, “What percentage per annum of 
acquisition requirements packages (ARP) were rejected by KOs due to unclear or 
unmeasurable requirements? Could this percentage be reduced with more or earlier 
contracting involvement?” 
Upon closer inspection of the source of these figures, the seemingly disparate 
rates actually support the findings that effective communication is critical to success. 
Without actually qualifying our interview question with a variable to capture whether the 
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interviewee questioned is currently in a program that is experiencing effective 
communication or not, our data cannot be directly compared to one another. For example, 
one respondent stated that only 1–2 percent per year are rejected and 50–60% require 
some rework (J. Kaiser, personal communication, May 13, 2015). This response came 
from an individual in a contracting organization that is embedded with the PM shop or, in 
other words, is working under the many-to-one model as it relates to the ratio of 
contracting professionals to programs/projects. Another respondent stated that 90–95% 
per year are rejected which leads to significantly increased lead times for procurements 
(T. Byrnes, personal communication, May 8, 2015). This response came from an 
individual in an organization that is working under the one-to-many model, in which each 
contracting professional is assigned to multiple programs/projects, and the same 
individual may not always be working the same procurement.  
This data highlights the potential problems when breakdowns in communications 
occur. Without the collaboration of the requiring activity and the contracting 
professionals, the difficulty of generating a representative, procurable set of requirements 
is increased exponentially. It is the job of the requiring activity to ensure that a correct 
and complete set of requirements is captured in the ARP. Jointly it is the responsibility of 
the contracting professionals to ensure that the requirements that are listed are 
unambiguous, verifiable, and testable. Creating this package jointly with communication 
and collaboration has been shown to reduce the time required to create the document, 
reduce rework required to gain approvals, and ultimately reduce overall cycle time for the 
acquisition. 
The protocols supporting the Yoder TIPS model that is in place by the program 
office for how the ARP will be staffed is critical to the effective communication of the 
requiring activity and contracting professionals. In order to ensure success in this area, 
there must be consideration for the collaboration required to generate the ARP correctly 
and in a timely manner.  
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6. Theme 6 - Policy 
The general consensus when inquiring about the effects of policy, law, and 
regulation on the performance of the Defense Acquisition System were mixed (Figure 
28).  
Figure 28.  Interview Question 7 Responses 
 
NOTE: The interview question for this response is, “When thinking of the Army 
Acquisition process, does current acquisition policy, law, and regulation have a positive 
or negative impact on Army acquisitions?” This question had three sub-questions. Please 
see Appendix for the complete list of questions. 
Upon deeper inspection, however, a more homogenous view is revealed. When 
speaking about the laws and regulations, the FAR and DOD 5000, the responses in 
general were that they support the process, provide guidance and direction, and are 
helpful (J. Kaiser, personal communication, May 13, 2015; P. Mann, personal 
communication, May 14, 2015). This research discovered several qualifiers to this 
statement. First and foremost is the notion that the “regulations are permissive by nature 
and interpretation as such is critical” (P. Mann, personal communication, May 14, 2015). 
The lack of direction or intentional ambiguity in certain areas of the regulation often 
leads to disagreements between the KO and the approving agency (T. Byrnes, personal 
communication, May 8, 2015). It is in these instances where the KO must be given the 
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opportunity to exercise his or her warranted authority, and the more permissive but not 
prohibited options must be taken. The addition of service, branch, and local policy can, as 
often happens, make the total regulatory process extremely rigid. These additional 
policies require further time and manpower to address, which is often not adequately 
planned or resourced (T. Byrnes, personal communication, May 8, 2015). Finally, the 
addition of policy or required actions done in an effort to prevent a reoccurrence of a past 
failure must be handled with extreme caution as these policies can accumulate quickly 
making their navigation almost impossible.  
The results of this research do not show any significant shortfalls in reference to 
communicating policies and procedures. Because of the legal implications, great care is 
taken in this area and significant resources are allocated to ensure that all applicable laws, 
regulations, policies, and procedures are followed. 
This theme provides an example of how the protocols pillar can be taken too far. 
We know from Yoder’s TIPS model that the correct protocols must be in place to ensure 
a successful organization. It is important to consider that this can also apply to having too 
many or improper protocols. One of the many issues with navigating the Defense 
Acquisition System today is not the primary Defense Acquisition Framework to include 
the DOD 5000 and the FAR but, rather, the hundreds of additional Service, Command, 
and local policies, along with appropriate case law, that make the system slow and 
traitorous to navigate. 
7. Theme 7 - Process 
“Decentralized contracting [KO apart from the PM] leads to a lack of synergy, 
lack of back and forth, [the] distance leads to packages being lost in a black hole” (J. 
Kaiser, personal communication, May 13, 2015). Multiple interviewees echoed the notion 
that separation of the contracting professionals from the program mangers is going to hurt 
the acquisition process. Currently, there is a move toward contracting “Centers of 
Excellence” that aims to centralize contracting actions for much of the Army (T. Byrnes, 
personal communication, May 8, 2015). According to the data collected in this paper, this 
will hurt the throughput times and performance of the acquisition system for those 
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affected by these changes. Additionally, a lack of “dashboards” (P. Mann, personal 
communication, May 14, 2015) or common Army “toolsets” (J. Kaiser, personal 
communication, May 13, 2015) that provide for better management and metric tracking 
hurt the ability of the Army to improve and streamline the acquisition contracting 
process.  
As stated previously, the distance that communication must travel is directly 
proportional to the signal loss or risk that the original message or intent will be altered. 
All signals attenuate over distance, so the farther removed the requiring activity is from 
the contracting professionals the more difficult and error prone the communications 
process becomes. It is important to note that it is not the proposition of this research that 
physical distance alone will cause communications problems with the acquisition 
process, but rather it is what we will call logical distance. It is possible, thanks to modern 
technology, for a requiring activity and contracting service to be separated by a large 
physical distance yet remain highly engaged and collaborative. This type of environment 
is represented by dedicated contracting professionals assigned to specific requisitions 
with minimal intermediary communication channels and high levels of engagement by 
the contracting team. Conversely, it is also possible to have a requiring activity and 
contracting team located in the same physical building, but for reasons dealing with 
communications protocols, personnel assignments, sense of ownership, and others, a 
large logical distance can be present, meaning that effective communications become 
very difficult. Additionally, the use of technology for disseminating information is 
critical in the modern acquisition environment. The use of performance metrics, status 
reporting, dashboards, and more can all significantly improve the situational awareness of 
team members and management, enabling communications that are more relevant and, 
thus, a higher likelihood of project success. 
The paradigm shift, moving contracting activities to Centers of Excellence, 
represents a change in protocol as defined in Yoder’s TIPS model. Adequate 
consideration must be given to the effect this change will have on the performance of the 
organization as viewed from the requiring activities perspective. The physical and logical 
separation that this and similar contracting protocols will place into the system will 
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increase difficulty of effective communications between the KO and PM. Additionally, 
the lack of systems (Yoder TIPS-defined platforms) such as performance metrics 
dashboards, unified systems for information sharing, and execution in place across the 
entire DOD represents a large hole in the supporting structure for organizational success.  
8. Theme 8 - Training 
This particular area of this research reveals what is perhaps the largest disparity in 
answers from the interviewees (Figure 29 and Figure 30). Several said the “training is 
available but requires discipline and time […] you get out what you put in” (P. Mann, 
personal communication, May 14, 2015); several others said that “training is not 
sufficient” (T. Byrnes, personal communication, May 8, 2015); and some respondents felt 
that “what is really needed is OJT [on the job training]” (J. Kaiser, personal 
communication, May 13, 2015). The majority responded that the training either does, or 
at least should, encourage collaboration and communication, and while it is clear that the 
PM and KO need to “stay in their own swim lanes” (C. Branscomb, personal 
communication, June 21, 2015) the training should be cross-functional to the extent 
enabling better collaboration between the PM and KO throughout the process. For 
example, learning the “jargon” (J. Kaiser, personal communication, May 13, 2015) and 
“building a common language and process” (K. Wojick, personal communication, April 




Figure 29.  Interview Question 10 Responses 
 
NOTE: The interview question for this response is, “Is there available training supporting 
the cross-functional duties between the PM and the KO?” 
Figure 30.  Interview Question 11 Responses 
 
NOTE: The interview question for this response is, “How does the current training 
encourage communication and collaboration between the PM and the KO?” 
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The field of experience as described by the Schramm communication model 
(Schramm, The Process and Effects of Mass Communication, as cited in Certo, & Certo, 
2006, p. 332) is the prime beneficiary of training, especially that which is cross-
functional and encourages communication. While it is clear that each function (PM and 
KO) has very distinct and specific duties, knowledge of how the other operates and 
requirements specific to the other’s field is invaluable in enabling collaborative work 
groups. Cross-functional training combined with OJT and developmental assignments 
must be designed to maximize the overlap that exists in the field of experience between 
the PMs and KOs. 
Training is critical to produce the right people. As is described in Yoder’s TIPS 
model, personnel is critical to ensure the success of an organization or, in our case, a 
program. The right training and experience is needed to ensure that personnel are being 
developed for these critical positions. 
9. Theme Links 
Figure 31 provides a graphical representation of the common themes extracted 
from the interview data. The graphic also depicts how the common themes are linked 
within the process of acquisition. The interaction amongst the themes can be described 
as: Policy, Process, and Training are required to support effective 
communication/collaboration between the PM and KO. Effective 
communication/collaboration between the PM and KO supports the successful outcome 
of two key products, the ARP and the contracting type (strategy). These two key products 
in turn drive the outcome of the last two themes, system performance and ultimately 
program success.  
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Figure 31.  Common Themes Extracted from Interview Data 
 
Figure 31 is not an all-encompassing formula for program success. As indicated 
by the unsourced inputs to the Success and Performance components, there are many 
other factors that can drive the outcome of these markers. Figure 31 is included to 
identify the common themes extracted from the interview data in this research and to 
provide flow and context for how they interact within the system as a whole.  
E. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the themes identified in the previous section, the following are the 
recommendations resulting from this research that once implemented will improve the 
performance of the DAS. Performance improvements are made through improving the 
outputs of the contracting phase, which heavily impacts the overall program outcome. 
The contracting products that drive these outcomes are significantly impacted by the level 
of communication and collaboration between the PM and KO. Recommendations are 


















Common Themes Extracted from Interview Data 
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1. Recommendation 1 
In order to reproduce the success enjoyed by the MRAP program across the DOD 
portfolio, this team recommends that, when possible, the contracting team be embedded 
within the requiring activity. If organic contracting capability is not feasible, it is 
imperative that the contracting resources be assigned to a requiring activity, maximizing 
stability and minimizing personnel changes.  
2. Recommendation 2 
In order to produce quality requirements packages, the acquisition team must have 
effective communication supported by a good requirements definition protocol. To 
ensure better success in this area, we recommend that a requirements definition protocol 
be selected early via a collaborative approach with the acquisition team to include 
contracting professionals.  
3. Recommendation 3 
It is the recommendation of this research team that acquisition professionals are 
empowered again. KOs must be given the ability to execute the full authority of the 
warrant that they are granted. This is not a recommendation to remove all oversight and 
checks and balances, but the system has become overly burdensome and restrictive such 
that the KOs are severely impacted in their ability to effectively execute the duties of 
their warrant. The solution for preventing excessive and gross error must be 
accountability and not legislation. 
4. Recommendation 4 
While the risk of program failure can never be completely eliminated, increased 
communication frequency and effectiveness will reduce the risk. Therefore, this team 
recommends that personnel, platforms, and protocols are established with a focus on 
maximizing communication and collaboration within the elements. 
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5. Recommendation 5 
It is the recommendation of this research group that the requiring activity has in 
place a protocol or set of protocols that outline how the requiring activity and contracting 
professionals will work collaboratively to generate the ARP. IPTs have been shown to be 
effective in this area but the scope of this recommendation is not so narrow as to say they 
are the only acceptable collaborative forum.  
6. Recommendation 6A 
One of the hallmarks of the regulatory system governing the operation of the 
Defense Acquisition System is a propensity to create a law or regulation whenever a 
misstep occurs in an attempt to prevent recurrence. While this step is sometimes 
necessary, this research team recommends migration to a system based on accountability 
where individuals and organizations are held responsible for their actions, as opposed to a 
micro-managed system in which errors are attempted to be regulated out of the process. 
7. Recommendation 6B 
An initiative to promulgate a shared understanding and freedom to interpret the 
regulations as permissive in nature will significantly improve the environment in which 
the PM and KO must collaborate. 
8. Recommendation 7A 
To effectively reduce the PM/KO signal path, the department must shift away 
from Contracting Centers of Excellence, or decentralized contracting from the program’s 
perspective, back to an embedded and customer-aligned paradigm, placing the 
contracting professionals as close to the requirement source as possible. 
9. Recommendation 7B 
In an effort to improve the department’s platforms that support the acquisition 
community, the development and deployment of a DAS-wide system for managing 
procurements, requirements, financials, and performance metrics should be initiated.  
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10. Recommendation 8 
Based on the preceding analysis, this research team recommends that the training, 
OJT, and developmental assignments be evaluated to ensure that the content is both 
cross-functional and encourages communication and collaboration. Additionally, the 
availably and dissemination of the existence of these training options and opportunities 
should be maximized. Vehicles such as DAU provide a great option for establishing 
training and certification requirements for the acquisition workforce.  
F. CONCLUSIONS 
The statistical data presented in this chapter shows that the Army is making 
improvements in some metric areas with respect to defense acquisition (for example, 
schedule growth for development contracts); however, the Army is also getting worse in 
key areas (for example, cost and schedule growth for production contracts). According to 
the last report on the Performance of the Defense Acquisition System, the overall 
effectiveness rate was 88% and suitability rate was 72% over the measurement period of 
1984–2013 (OUSD[AT&L], 2014, p. 16). This shows that we can and must do better. 
One of the common root causes highlighted by the PARCA office in their assessments 
both statutory and discretionary between 2010 and 2012 as published in the 2013 edition 
of the report on the performance of the Defense Acquisition System is contract 
performance. Specifically, over 56% of failures had one or more root causes linked to 
poor management performance to include the management of contract incentives 
(OUSD[AT&L], 2013, p. 34). 
When evaluating the current performance of communication and collaboration of 
the PM and KO against the Schramm communication model (Schramm, The Process and 
Effects of Mass Communication, as cited in Certo, & Certo, 2006, p. 332), the following 
key points have emerged. First is the benefit of a reduced signal distance represented by 
what was previously described as a low-logical separation between the PM and KO 
personnel. This is best accomplished by embedding the contracting professionals within 
the requiring activity, and this serves well in reducing the number of encoding and 
decoding errors. Second, the process, which will also be covered under the TIPS (Yoder, 
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2010) review of protocols, used by the team to effectively translate capability gaps and 
user needs into requirements packages that are procurable and representative of the item 
needed is important. Finally, the notion of bi-directional communication is critical. Bi-
directional communication as outlined by the Schramm communication model 
(Schramm, The Process and Effects of Mass Communication, as cited in Certo, & Certo, 
2006, p. 332) is imperative for the refinement of the requirements package to ensure that 
it is satisfactory to both parties, as well as in the selection and negotiation of the best 
contract type for the acquisition.  
Similarly, evaluating the current state of communications between the PM and 
KO against the Yoder TIPS model revels the following. First is personnel: Having the 
right people in place to ensure that the “logical” communication distance between the PM 
and KO is as short as possible requires that the proper training is available and being 
utilized. Additionally, with respect to organizational structure, it is critical to have the 
contracting professionals embedded or, at a minimum, customer-aligned with the 
requiring activity to ensure success. Second is the platforms: This is lacking in a 
consolidated system for requirements, funding, documentation, and metrics. A system 
that is available for the unified execution of the contracting system along with a 
dashboard for the situational awareness of decision-makers and key personnel is critical 
to the success of the requiring activity. Last is the protocols: This pillar is lacking both 
requirements definition protocols and proper operational oversight protocols to enable a 
successful organization. There must be a proper requirements definition protocol in place 
that outlines how the capability gap/user needs will be translated in a collaborative 
fashion into the relevant acquisition documents. Additionally, there is a significant 
protocol problem when considering the impact that contract authorization authorities and 
leadership can have on the selection and approval of the contracting type through the 
acquisition strategy or by other means. This often takes the shape of writing best 
practices into performance objectives or starting a lean project targeting a particular 
policy or process. There is no one-size-fits-all solution to the complex problem that is 
defense acquisition; thus, a single approach be required of all programs traversing the 
process should not be mandated. 
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The findings from tour research should come as no surprise; after all, 
communication and collaboration is mandated by current acquisition law and regulation. 
The current FAR outlines the communication processes in Chapter 7; the DOD 5000 
Series covers communication and the creation of IPTs for the development of the 
acquisition strategy numerous times; and the DAG covers the process, including 
communication in depth throughout their Chapter 14.  
It has been shown that problems with RFQs and ARPs can be caused by lack of 
communication between the two functional areas in question, and that contract execution 
problems does in more than 50% of failures analyzed by PARCA contribute to their 
demise (OUSD[AT&L], 2013, p. 34). Thus, it can be stated that while poor 
communication or collaboration is not a definitive indicator of a program destined for 
failure, it does cause significant problems within the system as we know it today. So how 
do we fix it? The recommendations here will be covered in more detail in the next 
chapter; however, as an overview, the contracting professionals must be adequately 
resourced for the amount of workload that they are given. This will allow all requiring 
activities to have contracting professionals either embedded or, at the very minimum, 
customer-aligned. These professionals (PM and KO) must be adequately cross-trained 
not to perform the duties of the other functional area but to share a field of experience 
sufficiently that effective communications will be enabled. A common information 
system (IS) that is used for everything from requirements tracking to contract creation 
and billing should be evaluated and deployed to maximize the benefits of the information 
age. Along similar lines, a performance metric measuring and reporting system should be 
deployed to maximize the information available to decision-makers. Finally, the system 
as a whole must become more accepting of a regulatory framework that is permissive in 
nature, meaning that laws, regulations, policies, and guidance should not be constantly 




This chapter presented both the quantitative and qualitative data that collected in 
support of this research. The quantitative data presented showed that the DAS is not 
performing well in all areas. Through PARCA reports and a case study, the point was 
made that poor program performance can be in part linked to poor contract performance. 
The reduction of qualitative interview data to common themes was used to show that 
poor contract performance is linked to poor communication between the PM and KO. 
Recommendations were provided for each common theme identified and analysis 
provided for why they are needed. In the next chapter, these recommendations are 
presented in a consolidated format along with recommendations for further research. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter provides an overview of the information and analysis provided in 
Chapters II through IV. To answer the thesis question of this research, the findings from 
the analysis performed in Chapter IV are linked back to the primary and secondary 
research questions. From these findings and answers to the research questions, we outline 
recommendations for corrective actions and for further research. Finally, a conclusion is 
presented outlining the importance of communication based on the models used in this 
research and linking it to the process between the PM and KO that is needed for 
successful acquisitions. 
The findings of this research show that program performance is dependent upon 
contract execution and, as such, the communication and collaboration of the PM and KO 
is critical. There are currently statistically significant problems with the performance of 
the DAS, especially in the areas of Army procurement contracts’ cost and schedule 
growth. According to the PARCA office, a majority of those programs with serious 
performance problems have a contributing factor of poor management including 
contracting incentives. The interview data collected shows that poor communication and 
collaboration has multiple effects on a program including the selection of contracting 
strategy and types. The failure to collaboratively select a contract type that properly 
incentivizes the contractor while simultaneously minimizing the risk to the government is 
a common problem found in poorly performing programs. 
A. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
To highlight key points and to reiterate the logic flow used to guide this research, 
this section provides an overview of Chapters I–IV. 
1. Chapter I 
Chapter I laid the foundation for the conduct of this research. It provided 
background into the roles and responsibilities of the PM and KO and historical 
perspective to build a common knowledge set amongst the readers. The case presents the 
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need for this research along with the benefits from implementing the results. The chapter 
describes an outline for the research methodology and narrates an overview of the 
research conducted. The research questions used to guide the process along with the 
organization of this paper conclude the chapter.  
2. Chapter II 
Chapter II covered current laws, regulations, policies, and guidance on the 
operation of the DAS. To adequately address the issue of communications between the 
PM and KO, it is important to have a common basis of knowledge regarding the 
environment within which both functional areas must operate. To this end, a review of 
the FAR, DFARS, DOD 5000 Series, DAG, BBP, and PARCA was conducted to provide 
a comprehensive high-level view of the boundaries that must be navigated throughout the 
acquisition process. Key takeaways from this chapter include the sheer volume of 
regulatory guidance published creating a challenging environment for the operation of the 
DAS; the regulatory mandate for communication between the PM and KO, 
“…acquisition, capability needs, and financial communities, and operational users shall 
maintain continuous and effective communications…” (Department of Defense, 2003, p. 
5); and the permissive nature of the environment, “…Government members of the 
Acquisition Team may assume if a specific strategy, practice, policy or procedure is in 
the best interests of the Government and is not addressed in the FAR, nor prohibited by 
law (statute or case law), Executive order or other regulation, that the strategy, practice, 
policy or procedure is a permissible exercise of authority” (Federal Acquisition 
Regulation, 2015, Subpart 1.102). 
3. Chapter III 
Chapter III outlined the framework used to analyze and reduce the interview data 
collected in support of this research. The research team utilized two models to determine 
communication/collaboration problems between the PM and KO during the acquisition 
process. First, the Schramm communication model (Schramm, The Process and Effects of 
Mass Communication, as cited in Certo, & Certo, 2006, p. 332) defines the basic process 
for effective communications between two people or organizations. It covers key areas 
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such as the field of experience of the sender and receiver, the encoding and decoding 
process, and the signal itself. This provided a foundation for understanding basic 
communication techniques. Second, the Yoder Three Integrative Pillars of Success 
(TIPS) model describes the three critical elements (pillars) that must be present in a 
successful organization: personnel, platforms, and protocols. Third, the IPA process was 
covered as the tool utilized to both design the research method and extract common 
themes from the interview data. Finally, the chapter gives a description of the interview 
data summary process and graphics to provide a cohesive framework for the analysis 
performed in Chapter IV. 
4. Chapter IV 
Chapter IV presents the data sets and provides analysis for the research. The 
researchers conducted a statistical review of the performance of the DAS to provide a 
basis of need for this research. Then we performed a review of several reports from the 
office of PARCA to link critical failures in the acquisition process to poor management 
performance, including ineffective use of contracts. The chapter presented a current case 
study, highlighting the bottom line effects of poor communication and collaboration 
between a requiring activity and a contracting shop. Finally, the common themes 
extracted from the interview data using the IPA process were presented and analyzed 
against the Schramm communications (Schramm, The Process and Effects of Mass 
Communication, as cited in Certo, & Certo, 2006, p. 332) and TIPS models to determine 
areas for improvement. There was a preview of recommendations for potential 
improvement and identification of recommendations for further research. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
In answering the primary research question, “To what degree does early and 
ongoing communication between the program manager and contracting officer, impact 
the success or failure of Army acquisition programs?” our research proved that early and 
continuous communication is critical to program success. When looking at the statistical, 
historical, and anecdotal data presented in Chapter IV, an additional discovery was made: 
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The contracting process is critical to overall program success. One hundred percent of the 
interviewees participating in this research echoed this sentiment and took a step further to 
state that the contract type selected is important. The selection of the proper contract type 
and effective execution of the contract is highly dependent of the effectiveness of 
communications between the PM and KO.  
2. Secondary Research Questions 
In answering the first secondary research question, “Are problems with RFPs and 
Contracts related to poor communication and collaboration between the KO and PM?” it 
is the conclusion of this research that, as stated by Mr. Mann, “even with good comms 
[communication] problems can still occur, but without it they are certain” (P. Mann, 
personal communication, May 14, 2015). Often times these problems are concentrated 
around the generation of the ARP and SOW that are then written into the RFPs and 
ultimately the contracts. Even though the ultimate content of the requirements is the sole 
responsibility of the PM, a collaborative process is necessary to make certain that both 
parties (PM& KO) agree on the ARP/SOW, making sure it is representative of the system 
needed and that the requirements are procurable.  
In answering the second secondary research question, “Does current acquisition 
policy, law, training, and regulation impact success/failure rates of contract execution?” 
the findings of this research indicate that current acquisition policy, law, training, and 
regulation does impact the success/failure rates of contract execution. While policies 
“provide direction and purpose to execute the job” (J. Kaiser, personal communication, 
May 13, 2015) and are, “in general […] very positive” (P. Mann, personal 
communication, May 14, 2015), the fact that the law is permissive must remain at the 
forefront (Federal Acquisition Regulation, 2015, Subpart 1.102). When the 
overwhelming number of laws and regulations become supplemented with service, 
command, and local policies combined with dissimilar interpretations of the 
“permissiveness” of the law, the process becomes paralyzing.  
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C. FINDINGS 
The top five common themes are presented here based on their impact on the 
performance of the DAS as determined by the findings of this research. From the overall 
set of themes identified in Section D of Chapter IV, we extracted this prioritized list. In 
order to improve the performance of the DAS, these key themes must be addressed based 
on the recommendations in Section D of this chapter. 
1. Theme 5 - ARP Collaboration 
This research found that acquisitions utilizing non-embedded or customer-aligned 
contracting professionals experienced a very high rate of ARP rejection. The ARP must 
be developed collaboratively with the PM and KO to ensure that accurate and traceable 
requirements are both captured and procurable. The Effective Communications finding 
will address this further. We identified this to be a protocol issue, where according to the 
TIPS model, the correct protocols must be in place for a successful organization.  
2. Theme 3 - Contract Type 
The interviewees for this research unanimously agreed that the contract type was 
critical for program success. While the final decision rests with the KO, it is in the best 
interest of the program to bilaterally decide on a contract type that will best serve the 
program’s risk management and requirements needs. This theme uncovered a deeper 
problem of contract type selection approval. During our interviews, several cases were 
revealed where a legal contract type was bilaterally selected between the PM and KO 
only to be rejected by contracting’s approving authority or higher headquarters. 
Additionally, there are often external pressures from headquarters and others attempting 
to influence the contract type depending on the visibility of the program. Finally, an 
environment of conformance exists, where often times PMs and KOs are pressured to use 
whatever contract type is currently in favor, to the extent that it even may become linked 
to the career progression of these individuals.  
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3. Theme 1 - Effective Communication 
Based on Schramm’s model for successful communications (Schramm, The 
Process and Effects of Mass Communication, as cited in Certo, & Certo, 2006, p. 332), 
we identified the following key ideas. In order to ensure effective communications 
between the PM and KO, a short logical distance between the two entities is required. 
Recall from Chapter IV that logical distance is lengthened by effects such as disparate 
organizations, layers of bureaucracy between the PM and KO, and the ineffective use of 
technology (email, SharePoint, online collaboration tools, etc.). A short logical distance is 
critical to maximize the overlap in the field of experience between the sender and 
receiver and to reduce the distance that the signal must travel and become subject to 
attenuation. This research found that when contracting professionals are embedded in the 
program office, communication and collaboration activities were much more prevalent. If 
this is not possible, the contracting team must be customer-aligned, meaning that they are 
assigned to a single requiring activity. The Yoder TIPS model Personnel pillar supports 
this, where the right people are in the right place within the organization.  
4. Theme 6 - Policy 
The laws and regulations, while “in general positive” (P. Mann, personal 
communication, May 14, 2015), can become asphyxiating when compounded with 
service, command, agency, and local policies. Combined with a common view that these 
laws are restrictive in nature, meaning that if something is expressly not allowed it is 
prohibited, the system becomes extremely slow and burdensome. There are two distinct 
areas for improvement: The first is to reduce the number of additional command, service, 
and local policies that are often created in response to an error under the illusion that a 
policy will prevent recurrence. Second is to effectively promulgate and encourage the 
permissive interpretation of the laws and regulations. 
5. Theme 7 - Process 
The current lack of a unified system for the PM and KO to connect all functional 
areas, such as financial, logistics, requirements, contracting, security, etc., represents a 
shortcoming in the platform pillar as defined by the Yoder TIPS model. An attempt at the 
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Standard Procurement System (SPS) in the late 1990s became so expensive that it never 
took off (J. Kiser, personal communication, May 13, 2015). Offices that desire this 
capability are left to themselves to develop and maintain their own toolset to perform 
these functions. The lack of a collaboration-enabling technology such as the SPS hurts 
the flow of information both up the chain of command for reporting purposes and across 
organizations for increased communication capabilities. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations, tied to a top five themes by number, are the 
result of the analysis of the key findings from the interview data as compared against the 
Schramm communications (Schramm, The Process and Effects of Mass Communication, 
as cited in Certo, & Certo, 2006, p. 332) and Yoder TIPS models. The top five 
recommendations are presented in the same order as the themes they correspond to in the 
previous section. The themes and recommendations are ordered based on their effects on 
the performance of the DAS. Based on the published models used for analysis, 
remediation is necessary to close gaps in the current process.  
1. Recommendation 5 
It is the recommendation of this research that beyond the regulatory requirement 
for collaboration on the acquisition strategy, that an internal protocol be established by all 
requiring activities defining how ARPs, SOWs, etc., will be developed collaboratively 
between the PM and KO.  
2. Recommendation 3 
The recommendation provided by this research group to address this issue is to 
empower the KOs to use and be accountable for their warranted authority granted by the 
government. Additionally, an effort must be made to change the paradigm surrounding 
the regulations’ restrictive nature.  
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3. Recommendation 1 
It is the recommendation of this research that whenever possible the program 
office or requiring activity has contracting personnel embedded within the organization 
and physically co-located with the PM. If this is not feasible, then the contracting 
personnel must be customer-aligned to the requiring activity by the overarching 
organization. 
4. Recommendation 6A 
A system of authority and accountability must be used to give the PMs and KOs 
the freedom and resources they require to do the jobs asked of them. A measurement 
system that will hold them accountable for their errors and results must be implemented.  
5. Recommendation 6B  
An effort must be made to educate the acquisition community of the permissive 
nature of the laws and regulations. Without the freedom to make decisions that is clearly 
defined in the FAR, the system becomes paralyzed. 
6. Recommendation 7A 
The initiative to decentralize contracting by moving to “Contracting Centers of 
Excellence” must be reversed to facilitate recommendation number one. With 
decentralization, contracting of the communication, collaboration, and continuity that are 
proven by this research to be critical to the overall programs performance are made 
difficult if not impossible.  
7. Recommendation 7B 
It is the recommendation of this research that an evaluation be completed on the 
development and deployment of a unified ERP-like system that will connect everyone in 
the acquisition field for the purposes of information sharing and workflow optimization. 
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E. FURTHER RESEARCH 
The scope of the research covered herein has been limited to providing an 
overarching, high-level view of this problem as a part of the whole system. There are 
three areas identified in this research as showing potential benefit from further research.  
1. Interviewee SME Availability 
Because of the lack of statistical data tying poor program performance to 
problems with contracts and contract problems to communications issues between the 
PM and KO, in order to effectively answer this question qualitative interview data must 
be used. Interviewees were selected based on their background in program management 
or contracting; the total number of subject matter expert (SME) candidates that were 
available to the researchers for this project were limited. It should be noted that even with 
the small number of participants that were interviewed, nine in total, we did not see a 
large standard deviation in the responses that would be indicative of an unacceptably 
small sample size. To ensure the findings of this research are truly representative of the 
larger system as a whole, however, it would be prudent to repeat this research with a 
larger sample size. 
2. Contract Type - Oversight 
Perhaps the largest issue without a clear path forward to arise from this research is 
that of contract type selection oversight by either the contracting agencies headquarters or 
another entity. The ability of an outside, often uninvolved, entity to unilaterally 
(oversight) change an otherwise bilateral (PM and KO) and agreed upon contract type 
without any basis in law or regulation undermines the collaborative process that this 
research seeks to promote. This is not to suggest that all contracting actions should not 
undergo a formal review process to ensure that all applicable laws and regulations are 
followed; rather, as per FAR part 7, notwithstanding prohibitions by law, the contract 
type should be selected based on the best interests of the program as determined by the 
KO with collaborative input from the PM. Further research is needed to investigate how 
frequently this is occurring in the DAS and to determine the root cause of these changes. 
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3. BBP Tenant 
Finally, the recent release of BBP 3.0, a document that is based on the idea of 
continuous process improvement (CPI), focuses more than ever on the BBP tenants. It is 
the proposition of this research that while BBP is overall beneficial and provides best 
business practices and a monitoring process that helps improve the system as a whole, not 
all ideas are good for all acquisitions. As stated by Mr. Frank Kendall USD[AT&L] in his 
forward contained in the 2014 Annual Report on the DAS, there is no one size fits all in 
acquisition. For example, the current shift to incentive-based contracts does not make 
sense in all cases. There seems to be significant pressure to implement all BBP focus 
areas as if they were codified in federal law. First, we recommended further research to 
determine the extent of the BBP-forced compliance phenomenon within the DAS. 
Second, we recommend an attempt to address a process to both leverage the CPI model 
that is BBP, along with its best business practice-like recommendations, while 
maintaining the freedom of the acquisition professionals to ultimately select the best 
options for their program. Finally, we recommend studying the possibility of adding a 
communications focus area to the next iteration of the BBP as improvement in this area 
will provide critical support to the overall goals of the initiative.  
F. SUMMARY 
In closing, communication plays a critical role in every acquisition, especially in 
the contracting portion as has been investigated in this research. This research has shown, 
based on published performance models (Schramm communication; Yoder TIPS), the 
current shortfalls that exist within the operation of the DAS as it exists today with respect 
to PM and KO communications and collaboration. In light of the budgetary constraints of 
modern times in the defense industry, along with the duty to be good stewards of the 
taxpayers’ dollar, every effort must be made to maximize the efficiency of the DAS and 
increase its relative output capacity. In order to accomplish this, the issue of 
communication must be addressed and taken seriously.  
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APPENDIX. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
Interview questions 
-Current success/failure rates of Army acquisitions. 
 
1. How does communication between the contracting officer (KO) and the program 
manager (PM) affect the process of developing the acquisition requirements 
package, publishing the solicitation, and awarding a contract in a timely manner? 
Please provide examples. 
 
2. How does communication between the PM and KO factor in to ensuring the 
success of Army acquisitions (Success being a suitable, survivable, and 
sustainable capability being delivered on schedule and within budget)?  
 
3. Where has communication, or lack thereof, between the PM and KO been a 
contributing factor to the failure of an Army acquisition (failure being an APB 
breach, cost overrun, schedule slip)? Please provide specific examples. 
 
4. According to a March 2011 GAO report titled Trends in Nunn-McCurdy cost 
breaches for major defense acquisition programs, since 1997 there have been 74 
breaches involving 47 programs with 18 of those programs having breached more 
than one time. How have failures been a direct result of the contracting process as 
they relate to communication between the KO and the PM? Please provide 
specific examples. 
 
-Issues with RFPs/contracts effecting program performance. 
 
5. Does contract type (fixed-priced, cost-reimbursement or time and materials 
Contracts) have an effect on a programs performance? What trends can be 
attributed to a higher number of program failures when using one contract type 
over another? Is the contract type in question selected unilaterally (PM or KO), 
bilaterally (PM and KO), or required by policy? Please provide examples. 
  
6. What percentage per annum of acquisition requirements packages (ARP) were 
rejected by KOs due to unclear or unmeasurable requirements? Could this 




-Policy, law, and regulation 
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7. When thinking of the Army acquisition process, does current acquisition policy, 
law, and regulation have a positive or negative impact on Army acquisitions?  
 
a. How does application (adherence) of the DOD 5000 Series impact the 
success/failure rates of Army acquisitions as it relates to contracting 
collaboration/involvement? 
 
b. How does application (adherence) of the FAR/DFARS series impact the 
success/failure rates of Army acquisitions as it relates to contracting 
collaboration/involvement? 
 
c. How does the application (adherence) to the Federal Acquisition Reform 
Act, Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act, and Service Acquisition 
Reform Act regulations impact the success/failure rates of Army 
acquisitions as it relates to contracting collaboration/involvement? 
 
8. How will the Better Buying Power initiative impact Army acquisitions as they 





9. Are there any trends in which tools, processes, and procedures used in Army 
acquisitions impact the success or failure rates of contracts and programs? For 
those positively affected, was there a noticed increase in communication and 
collaboration between the PM and KO throughout the program? 
 
10. Is there available training supporting the cross-functional duties between the PM 
and the KO? 
 
11. How does the current training encourage communication and collaboration 
between the PM and the KO? 
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